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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF THE COMPOSITIONAL CHANGE ON THE DECISIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF TURKEY
I˙PEK ECE S¸ENER
Political Science, M.A. Thesis, July 2018
Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Oya Yeg˘en
This thesis studies the motivations behind Constitutional Court justices’ decisions, and
investigates whether the compositional change of the Court significantly influenced the
decisions justices make. By using an original and comprehensive dataset, I measure
the Constitutional Court justices’ ideal points in a two dimensional ideology space. I
then question whether justices’ ideologies and background characteristics are significant
determinants of their votes and dissents in annulment action cases between 2002 and
2016. The findings suggest that the more restrainist and liberal a justice is, the more
likely she will vote for the unconstitutionality. The empirical analyses also show that
ideology is a significant determinant of justices’ dissenting votes and conditional upon
the majority decision. An equally important question this thesis seeks to answer is
whether the impact of justices’ ideologies on their votes has been significantly different
after the Court’s compositional change. I show that the activist-restrainist dimension
was not a significant determinant of justices’ votes but became significant after the 2010
Constitutional Amendments. The analyses also show that the probability of voting for
the unconstitutionality of annulment action cases between 2010 and 2016 is significantly
lower than the cases between 2002 and 2010.
Keywords: Constitutional Court of Turkey, Judicial Politics, Constitutional Amend-
ment, 2010 Referendum, AKP
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O¨ZET
YAPISAL DEG˘I˙S¸I˙KLI˙G˘I˙N TU¨RKI˙YE CUMHURI˙YETI˙ ANAYASA MAHKEMESI˙
KARARLARINA ETKI˙SI˙
I˙PEK ECE S¸ENER
Siyaset Bilimi, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2018
Tez Danıs¸manı: Dr. O¨g˘r. U¨yesi Oya Yeg˘en
Bu tez, Anayasa Mahkemesi yargıc¸larının kararlarının ardındaki motivasyonları incele-
mekte ve mahkemenin yapısındaki deg˘is¸iklig˘in yargıc¸ların aldıg˘ı kararlara olan etkisini
aras¸tırmaktadır. Tezde oldukc¸a kapsamlı ve orjinal bir veri seti kullanarak, Anayasa
Mahkemesi yargıc¸larının iki boyutlu ideolojik du¨zlemdeki ideal noktalarını saptıyoruz.
Yargıc¸ların ideolojilerinin, 2002 ve 2016 yılları arasında go¨ru¨len iptal davalarındaki oy-
larının ve muhalefet etme davranıs¸larının anlamlı belirleyicileri olup olmadıg˘ını sorgu-
luyoruz. Kısıtlayıcı ve liberal yargıc¸ların, iptal davasında anayasaya aykırılık bulma
olasılıg˘ının dig˘er yargıc¸lara go¨re daha yu¨ksek oldug˘unu go¨steriyoruz. I˙deolojinin yargıc¸-
ların muhalefet etme davranıs¸larının o¨nemli bir belirleyicisi oldug˘unu ve c¸og˘unluk kara-
rına bag˘lı oldug˘unu da go¨steriyoruz. Tezin u¨c¸u¨ncu¨ bo¨lu¨mu¨nde, yargıc¸ların ideolo-
jilerinin oyları u¨zerindeki etkisinin mahkemenin yapısal deis¸iklig˘inden sonra anlamlı
o¨lc¸u¨de deg˘is¸ip deg˘is¸medig˘ini de sorguluyoruz. Ampirik tahliller, eylemci-kısıtlayıcı
boyutun, 2002-2010 yılları arasında yargıc¸ların oylarının anlamlı bir belirleyicisi deg˘ilken
bu tarihten sonra anlamlı hale geldig˘ini go¨steriyor. Ayrıca, mahkemenin 2010 yılı son-
rasında go¨ru¨len iptal davalarında anayasaya aykırılık bulma ihtimalinin bu tarihten o¨nce
go¨ru¨len davalara nazaran o¨nemli o¨lc¸u¨de du¨s¸u¨k oldug˘unu da go¨steriyoruz.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Anayasa Mahkemesi, Yargı, Anayasa Deg˘is¸iklig˘i Referandumu,
AKP
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To all teachers, academics, physicians and public officials
who are dismissed from profession with executive orders.
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1 INTRODUCTION
During the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) period, a
number of crucially important constitutional and institutional changes have taken place.
Apart from the judiciary, institutional settings of almost all ministries and many other
state agencies including the High Council of Education, Supreme Council of Radio and
Television, and National Intelligence Organization have undergone series of changes with
either the majority vote of the AKP deputies in the Grand Turkish National Assembly
(TBMM), or via numerous constitutional amendments. Allegedly, state institutions
were designed in a way to preserve the Kemalist state ideology, as well as the interests
of its representatives within the military-bureaucratic-judicial elite and the influential
economic stakeholders. Coming from the non-elite periphery and in explicit conflict with
the dominant ideology among the “old elites,” the AKP has legitimized most of these
reforms through the need to democratize the institutions by disentangling them from
the surveillance of state-ideology and elites.12 Opponents of the reforms, however, have
long argued that the motivation behind AKP’s reforms was to remove the obstacles to
extending its power (Somer, 2017; Gursoy, 2015). What the AKP calls democratization,
1Mynet News. October 21st, 2013. “Some elites struggle for reversing the democracy back.”
http://www.mynet.com/haber/politika/kurtulmustan-demokratiklesme-aciklamasi-835726-1 Con-
sulted on June 27th, 2018.
2TRT News. March 13th, 2018. “Democratic transformation will be completed in 10
years” http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/10-yil-icinde-demokratik-donusum-tamamlanacak-
78182.html Consulted on June 27th, 2018.
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they argue, is the transfer of key offices from the “old” state-elite to the newly emerging
one, which would eventually allow for consolidating a great amount of power in the same
hands.
While all such changes have become the subjects of severe public discussions, the
2010 reforms of the judiciary branch, especially the change in the composition of the
Constitutional Court of Turkey (CCT) has often attracted particular attention. Since
the judiciary is one of the, if not the, most powerful control mechanism over the ex-
ecutive and legislative bodies, the CCT is argued to assume the guardianship of the
foundational state ideology, and thus the change in its institutional setting is argued
to denote its democratization by letting the TBMM and president (i.e., two democrati-
cally elected bodies in the republican era) appoint its new members (Bali, 2011-12). In
contradiction, the opponents of the reforms maintained that the increase in the number
of Court members would allow the AKP to extend its influence over the Court and
easily overpass its supervisory power over legislature (Kalaycioglu, 2012).
I believe that the close study of the compositional change of the CCT can help us not
only understand the effects of such changes on the decisions made by the Court, but also
give an idea about the nature of the reforms undertaken during the AKP rule. Firstly, a
thorough analysis of the Court decisions would provide us with the empirical evidence to
make inferences about the Court’s ideological positioning. A longitudinal examination
of the CCT decisions would bring whether the CCT has always been crammed with
justices who adopt the foundational state ideology and behave in a way to guard the
military-bureaucratic state elites’ interests, or appointees of various presidents formed
disparate combinations of justices to light. Such an analysis, for this reason, would help
us assess the attested motivations behind the judicial reforms of 2010 in particular, and
provide us with a better understanding of the motivations behind the AKP’s reforms
in general.
Secondly, more than seven years after the compositional change of the CCT, an
2
examination of the impact of the increase in the number of Court members can now
yield empirical evidence showing for the Court had “democratized” after the reforms,
or became vulnerable to the influence of legislative and executive bodies. With the
comparison of justices’ ideological preferences, and/or the comparison of the Court
decisions made before and after the 2010 Constitutional Amendments, we can grasp
whether the reforms have led to the intended consequences. We surely cannot draw
broad inferences about all changes in the constitutional structure of Turkey, but I
believe this project would at least provide us with the reasons to enquire more into
some of many causes and consequences of them.
For such an undertaking, we need to seek answers to questions such as: 1) What mo-
tivates CCT justices’ decisions? –e.g., Do justices vote ideologically? Which ideological
dimensions help explain the CCT justices’ voting patterns? Does the Court act as the
guardian of the Kemalist state ideology? Do justices appointed by distinct presidents
have varied ideological stands? Justices with which ideological preferences are more
likely to find AKP legislation unconstitutional? 2) How did the compositional change
affect justices’ voting behavior? –e.g., Does the Court act as a guardian of the Kemalist
state ideology after the increase in the number of its members? Did the change in the
size of the Court altered the effects of justices’ ideological preferences on their votes?
–e.g., How much more or less likely is a justice with certain ideological preferences to
vote against AKP legislation after the 2010 Constitutional Amendment?
In this project, by compiling and employing a comprehensive justice-level dataset3
on the Court decisions between 2002 and 2016, I aim to come up with empirically
supported answers to such questions. More specifically, this study builds on two main
research questions: 1) What are the determinants of CCT justices’ decisions?, and
2) how did the compositional change of the CCT affect the decisions justices make?
To answer the former question, I examine the Court justices’ voting and dissenting
3The dataset is available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/ipekecesener
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behavior, and assess the alleged motivations behind the judicial reforms. In answering
the latter, I compare justices’ votes and dissents before and after the 2010 Constitutional
Amendment, and examine whether the reforms gave rise to a significant change in the
direction of Court decisions.
The rest of this project is divided into four chapters and a conclusion. The first
chapter presents the historical background and discussions regarding the status of the
judiciary in Turkish politics. With a brief examination of the constitution-making pro-
cess from a historical perspective, I argue that the amount of power and independence
granted to the judiciary in each constitution has been extensively used by the law-
makers as a means to strengthen its hand. I touch upon the discussions on the CCT’s
guardianship of state-elites’ interests, and refer to a number of important instances that
support this argument. The first chapter also provides an overview of the 2010 reforms
and a discussion of whether they promise any improvement on democratization.
I present the dataset in the second chapter. In doing so, I first review the previ-
ous data compilation efforts on high courts from a comparative perspective, point out
conventional practices, and explain the coding procedure I followed while compiling the
dataset employed in this project. Since justices’ ideology scores are highly important
parts of the inferences we make about the Court decisions, I pay particular attention to
the operationalization of justice ideology. I then provide an overview of the dataset, and
show that the justices appointed by distinct presidents often have disparate ideologi-
cal preferences and frequently vote in opposite directions. This chapter also provides
descriptive statistics on justices’ ideological preferences, and voting and dissenting pat-
terns before and after 2010.
The third chapter aims to answer the first main research question noted above,
and investigates the determinants of justices’ votes for the unconstitutionality of AKP
legislation. It concludes that activist-restrainist and liberal-conservative ideology di-
mensions are significant determinants of justices’ votes. In the third chapter, I also
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introduce the concept of “procedural cases,” which stands for the cases that are con-
cluded with unanimous vote. I maintain that justices’ ideological preferences do not
reflect onto their decisions in such cases. In this regard, I also report the findings for
the non-procedural cases. By removing the procedural cases from the sample, we can
reach at more precise estimates of the effects of justice ideologies on their votes.
In the second part of the third chapter, I touch upon the importance of dissent in
the studies of judicial behavior, and examine the dissenting patterns of CCT justices.
The findings suggest that justices’ dissenting votes against majority decisions are also
motivated by their latent ideological preferences. However, whether they dissent against
majority decision largely varies conditionally on the direction of the majority decision.
The fourth chapter tackles with the second research question on the Court’s com-
positional change. It investigates the impact of the increase in the number of the Court
members by comparing the effects of justices’ ideologies on their votes before and after
the 2010 Constitutional Amendment. It also presents whether the predicted proba-
bilities of voting against AKP legislation and dissenting against the majority decision
demonstrate statistically and substantively significant change after the Amendments.
The estimates for the cases excluding the procedural ones are also presented in the
fourth chapter, where I briefly discuss whether the findings also suggest a change in the
polarity in the Court after 2010.
In conclusion, I review the empirical findings and explain their significance for our
understanding of the judiciary’s place in Turkish politics. The thesis concludes that ide-
ological preferences have been substantively significant determinants of CCT justices’
voting and dissenting behavior during the AKP rule. However, the activist-restrainist
dimension has become significant only after 2010. In other words, however ideological
decisions the Court may have made in certain key cases between 2002 and 2010, the
degree to which justices prefer preserving the Kemalist state ideology did not motivate
their votes in the universe of annulment action cases between these years. The the-
5
sis also concludes that the probability that justices vote against AKP legislation has
significantly decreased after 2010, which might suggest that the AKP has successfully
extended its influence over the Court via the Constitutional Amendments increasing
the size of the Court and changing the appointment procedures.
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2 THE JUDICIARY IN THE CONTEMPORARY
HISTORY OF TURKEY
Both the structure and the status of the judiciary of Turkish government have recently
undergone a series of reforms with the supposed aim of strengthening independence,
impartiality and efficiency of the judicial system. Along with several other comple-
menting articles, the changes in the composition of the Constitutional Court and the
High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HCJP) with the constitutional amend-
ment of 2010 were considered by many as notably promising reforms to improve the
performance of the judiciary. Not only the supporters of the incumbent AKP but also
a majority of independent liberal democrats, including academicians, journalists, and
major European institutions such as the European Union, Venice Commission, and
Council of Europe declared their support for the reforms.4 In nearly eight years since
the amendment, however, no major improvement in the performance of the judiciary
has been reported. Contrarily, cross-national comparisons suggest that the Turkish ju-
dicial performance is in decline,5 and international organizations often urge Turkey to
4BBC News. September 13, 2010. “Turkish reform vote gets Western backing.”
https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-11279881 Consulted on June 27, 2018.
5Turkey’s global rankings according to the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index are as
follows: in 2014, 59/99; in 2015, 80/102; in 2016, 99/113. Available at: http://worldjustice
project.org/publications Consulted on June 27, 2018.
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respect the independence of the judiciary and uphold the rule of law.6 Acknowledging
the importance attached to it, I will examine the recent reforms of the judiciary in
this section. I will first briefly put the Turkish judiciary in historical context, and then
discuss the importance of the recent reforms for the contemporary Turkish politics.
2.1 The Evolution of the Turkish Judiciary
As only an independent and impartial judiciary duly enforcing land’s law can make
sure that the arbitrary government power is restricted, judicial independence is con-
sidered as sine qua non for a properly functioning democracy. Nevertheless, Turkey’s
experience in implementing the principle of separation of powers and ensuring judicial
independence has been anything but consistent. Not only the power granted to each
branch of government has been imbalanced, but the relative supremacy of one branch
over the others has also altered with the constitutional changes and amendments. The
first Constitution of the Republic, the 1924 Constitution, embodied a rather simplistic
“Rousseauist” or majoritarian view of democracy with the concentration of the legisla-
tive and executive powers in the “assembly government” in theory, and transforming
into a “legislative supremacy” over the executive body in practice (Kalaycioglu, 2005;
Genckaya and Ozbudun, 2009). Concordantly, the main defect of the 1924 Constitution
is considered to be “its lack of effective system of check and balances to check the power
of elected majorities” (Ozbudun, 2000, p. 52). During the Republican People’s Party
(RPP) rule of the 1923-50 era, however, concentration of powers in the parliamentary
did not seem to create a major system breakdown as no meaningful distinction between
the government and the bureaucracy, and between the party and the state were to be
drawn (Belge, 2006, p. 659).
In his well-known work, Mardin (1975) presents the part of the Turkish society
6Among them are the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENJC), and International Comission of Jurists (IJC).
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Table 1 Judiciary in the Constitutions of the Republican Period
Constitutions Judicial Review Council of Judges Supremacy
1924 Constitution No No Legislative
1961 Constitution Yes Yes Judiciary&Bureaucracy
1982 Constitution Yes Yes Executive
2010 Amendment Yes Yes Executive
concentrated all power at hand as the “Center,” which corresponds to the military
and the bureaucratic elites’ alliance under RPP, and the remaining forces that do not
belong to the military-bureaucratic ruling class as the “Periphery.” Accordingly, with
the transition to multi-party politics and Democrat Party (DP) gaining the majority
of seats in the parliament, “military-bureaucratic ruling class’” domination over the
politics was challenged by the effectively mobilized peripheral forces (Ozbudun, 2006,
p. 284). Only then the need to put formal restraints on the legislative power, notably a
judicial mechanism for reviewing the constitutionality of laws and sufficient safeguards
for the independence of the judiciary found support among the state elites (Genckaya
and Ozbudun, 2009, p. 13).
The RPP and the so-called state elites, namely the military-bureaucratic ruling class
together with the intellectuals, wrote, confirmed, and promulgated the 1961 Constitu-
tion by which they secured important enclaves of political power for themselves (Belge,
2006, p. 657). Not only were the forces of the ’Periphery’ left outside the process of
constitution making, they were also not granted place in the composition of the Second
Republic. More than anything, the 1961 constitution had put an end to the uncondi-
tional legislative supremacy by introducing an effective system of checks and balances
to prevent arbitrary use of power. Introduction of judicial review and the High Council
of Judges, also strengthening the administrative courts are instances demonstrating the
enhancement of the relative power and independence of the judiciary with respect to
others. Therefore, while the constitution expanded social rights and civil liberties of
citizens, it reflected distrust of politicians and elected majoritarian assemblies (Genck-
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aya and Ozbudun, 2009, p. 16), and increased bureaucracy’s (especially senior judges,
military officials, and technocrats) supervisory role over politicians (Belge, 2006, p. 663).
Starting with the 1971 and 1973 constitutional revisions, every attempt at amending
the Constitution served to curb the judiciary’s power in terms of restricting the scope
and limits of judicial review. The making and substance of the 1982 Constitution
reflected an even more distrust of authorities (mainly the National Security Council)
than that of the 1961 Constitution towards all civilian actors, this time including the
former allies in the judiciary and the state bureaucracy (Shambayati and Kirdis, 2009,
p. 773). The formation of the third republic highlighted an “executive supremacy” with
a legally and politically irresponsible Presidency in charge of guarding and arbitrating
the political system, the executive being only nominally controlled by the legislature,
and the judiciary strictly monitored by the Ministry of Justice (Kalaycioglu, 2005,
p. 128). Once again, the power relations among the branches of the government were
designed from above without necessarily considering the democratic principles, but to
secure a stable order under the control of the office of the President.
2.2 Judiciary as the Guardian of State Elites’ Interests
In his “hegemonic preservation” thesis, Hirschl (2004, p. 91) suggests that “political
elites can insulate their increasingly challenged policy preferences against popular po-
litical pressure by the constitutionalization of rights and the establishment of judicial
review when majoritarian decision-making processes are not operating to their advan-
tage.” In such conditions, he reminds, “an unprecedented amount of power is trans-
ferred from representative institutions to judiciaries” (2004, p. 71) creating what he
calls “juristocracy.” Basically, threatened political, economic and judicial elites reach an
agreement on the judicial empowerment through constitutionalization, and the courts,
in general, behave in the direction that such elites expect them to behave.
In Turkey’s experience, that the military-bureaucratic elite entrusted the Consti-
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tutional Court with the right of reviewing the constitutionality of the Parliament’s
abstract decisions is considered granting the judiciary with a privileged position vis-
a`-vis the “elected branch.” Some scholars (Belge, 2006; Ozbudun, 2006; Shambayati
and Kirdis, 2009) suggest that when state elites realized their impotence before the
populist right-wing majority to acquire the necessary parliamentary power to pass de-
sired laws and regulations, they came up with the instrument of judicial review which
would protect their fundamental values and interests. The argument goes so far as to
suggest that the Constitutional Court was first established “as the guardian of a Repub-
lican constitution against Democrats” (Belge, 2006, p. 664), and its primary function,
with the 1982 Constitution, came to be “assisting the executive” in achieving the goals
of the political system (Shambayati and Kirdis, 2009, p. 775). Hence, Hirschl’s term
“juristocracy” is found suitable for the Turkish context.
Several controversial decisions of the Constitutional Court support these arguments.
Most recently in 2007 and 2008, two legislative attempts of the AKP, a non-state-elite
party that gained more than 45% of votes, were averted by the Court. In 2007, the
parliamentary voting for the presidency was cancelled as the non-state-elite candidate
Abdullah Gul was expected to win, and in 2008, the constitutional amendment permit-
ting the use of headscarf in universities was struck down. These instances are striking
in the sense that both the usage of headscarves in universities and the presidency of
Abdullah Gul were actually demanded by the grassroots of AKP, as became evident
in the results of the subsequent general elections and the referendum. However, these
demands were not compatible with state-elites’ “fundamental values and interests,” and
therefore prevented by the judicial authorities. It seems that in certain circumstances,
the existence of the rule of law, or that the government in all its actions is bound by
law fixed and announced beforehand, does not follow the existence of government by
and for the people, as the law that binds the government has not been written by and
for the people.
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Contrary to the arguments in favor of Constitutional Court of Turkey’s “juristo-
cratic” state, Hazama (2012), based on a quantitative analysis of Court’s decisions
during the 1984-2007 period, suggests that the above-mentioned instances reflect exem-
plary cases rather than a long-term pattern. In other words, although the Court has
long showed a strong tendency to accept unconstitutionality claims by state-elite pres-
idents, it has also frequently annulled laws passed by the executive branch. Therefore,
Hazama (2012) argues that the Court’s preference is for horizontal accountability over
hegemonic preservation and not vice versa.
2.3 2010 Reforms of the Judiciary
The 1982 Constitution has been amended more than 15 times to enhance the liberal-
democratic standards in general, but no major change in the status or functions of
the judiciary could be made until 2010, although it was subject to debates all along.
Even the proposal for a modest change in the selection of justices to the Constitutional
Court in 2004 received severe criticisms from the presidents of high courts. That AKP
kept his public support steadily increasing in the elections in face of the incidents such
as the Constitutional Court’s controversial provisions, the Ergenekon trials, and the
proclamation of the “e-memorandum” made a constitutional amendment proposing
fundamental changes in the relative power of judiciary possible. At this point it would
be informative to briefly address two main changes 2010 Amendment brought about to
the structure of the Turkish judiciary.
2.3.1 The High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors
For the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, an internationally-held principle
is that the tenure of judges needs to be secured, and this principle necessitates the
existence of independent and impartial high judicial councils. To that end, all the
proceedings regarding judges and public prosecutors of civil and administrative courts
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are operated by the HCJP in Turkey. In the 1961 Constitution, the Council was formed
as the High Council of Judges, and no member from executive was to be found among
its ranks. Yet, the 1982 Constitution restructured the Council as the High Council of
Judges and Public Prosecutors, and put the Minister of Justice in its presidency.
The main idea of the 2010 Amendment regarding the HCJP (also for the Constitu-
tional Court) was to increase the number of its members to give it a more pluralistic
and representative structure (Ozbudun, 2015a, p. 45). According to the initial arrange-
ment, the High Council’s members were being elected by and from among two high
courts (the Court of Cassation and Council of State), whereas the 2010 Amendment
changed the procedure such that they will be elected by and from among all general
and administrative courts judges and public prosecutors, in addition to four regular
members appointed directly by the President. In that sense, the popular vote in 2010
created a much more representative, pluralistic and powerful HCJP and so judiciary,
but also one that is much open to the influence of the executive branch.
The Venice Commission, in its opinion dated in December 2010, states that “the
new HCJP is formally a much more independent institution than its predecessor, and
the new system formally fulfills most European standards” (Bartole and Maan, 2010,
p. 28). Similarly, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe defined the reform
“as a significant step in Turkey’s further democratic development.”7 Seemingly, several
international judicial organizations welcomed the new structure of the judiciary as it
gave a democratic outlook and came to comply with the European standards and prac-
tices. However, both the proposal and the adoption of the law regarding the form of
HCJP created great countrywide controversy among different segments of the Turkish
population including political elites, academics, civil society organizations, business as-
sociations, trade unions, and alike. Those opposing the part of the amendment argued
that the law intends to politicize the judiciary and brings it closer to the (non-state-
7Council of Europe, Press Release 648(2010). Available at: https://wcd.coe.int Consulted on June
27th, 2018.
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Table 2 The Change in the Composition of the HCJP
Members 1982 Constitution 2010 Amendment
President Minister of Justice Minister of Justice
Vice President Undersecretary Undersecretary
Appointed by the President 5 4
Elected by the High Courts - 16
Total 7 22
elite) ruling party more than making the HCJP independent.8 In fact, the elections in
the aftermath of the amendment is alleged to be influenced by the Ministry of Justice
as the seats were seemed to comprise AKP government favorites (Ertekin, 2001).
Only three years after the amendment ha passed, another major arrangement was
proposed and regarding the structure of the HCJP. Following the disclosure of corrup-
tion charges involving four ministers and several other AKP members, the government
attempted to change the law about “judicial police” so that the executive body to be
informed priorly to the eruption of such cases. When the HCJP denounced the attempt
as unconstitutional and prevented the execution of the law, then Prime Minister Er-
dogan declared that “the HCJP committed an illegal act, and the nation is who will
judge them,”9 and that “we made a mistake by empowering the HCJP, the Minister
of Justice should have remained as its supervisory mechanism.”10 Two months later, a
bill intending to limit the powers of the Plenary of the HCJP and strengthen the role
of the Minister of Justice as its president went into force. Once again, judiciary’s rela-
tive power among the branches of the government was altered as the Minister of Justice
8Former Izmir bar president Noyan O¨zkan’s arguments can be an example of this stance: “Judicial
system and High Courts will be harnessed by the executive with this constitutional amendment pack-
age.” http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/124356-15-soruda-anayasa-paketi-ve-hayir Consulted on June
27th, 2018.
9Hu¨rriyet Daily News, December 27, 2013. “I would judge the Supreme Council of Judges and
Prosecutors if I had authority: Turkish PM” http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/i-would-judge-the-
supreme-council-of-judges-and-prosecutors-if-i-had-authority-turkish-pm-60233 Consulted on June 27,
2018.
10Hu¨rriyet. December 29, 2013. “Erdogan: Orada bir yanlis yaptik” http://www.hurriyet.com.tr
gundem/erdogan-orada-bir-yanlis-yaptik-25465765 Consulted on June 27, 2018.
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ended up with an unlimited authority to reorganize the HCJP (Ozbudun, 2015a, p. 47).
Accordingly, starting with the allegations of corruption11 and reaching its peak with the
July 15 coup attempt,12 the government stepped up a purge on the judiciary both in
terms of relegation and dismissal from profession, which attracted great domestic and
international criticism.
2.3.2 The Constitutional Court
Article 148 of the 1982 Constitution defines main functions of the Constitutional Court
as “examining the constitutionality in respect of both form and substance, of laws,
decrees having the force of law and the Rules of Procedure of the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey, and decide on individual applications” (Const. of the Republic of
Turkey, amend. 2011, art. 148). The types of cases that could be brought to the Court
are annulment action/remedy of objection, financial supervision of political parties,
suspension of execution, passing a warning to political parties, banning of political
parties and abolition of immunity, and individual application. Annulment actions are
lodged upon the claim that a code, decree in the power of law, and a particular article
or provision is contradictory to the Constitution. According to the Article 35 of the
Code on Establishment and Rules of Procedures of the Constitutional Court (Code No:
6216) only the president of the Republic of Turkey, parliamentary groups of the ruling
and the main opposition party, and members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey
who constitute at least one fifths of the absolute number of members are authorized
to lodge annulment actions. Remedy of objection, on the other hand, stands for lower
courts’ power to lodge a file to the Constitutional Court upon finding the provisions
11The Telegraph, January 22, 2014. “Turkey continues with huge purge of judges and police.”
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10590399/Turkey-continues-with-huge-
purge-of-judges-and-police.html Consulted on June 27, 2018.
12Bloomberg, July 18, 2016. “Turkey’s Judicial Purge Threatens the Rule of Law.”
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-18/turkey-s-judicial-purge-threatens-the-rule-
of-law Consulted on June 27, 2018.
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of a code or a decree in the force of law which will be applied in a case, contradictory
with the Constitution. While annulment actions should be lodged within ten days from
the day on which a code is published in the Official Gazette, remedy of objection is
available for courts any time they find the provisions of a code that will be applied in
a certain case contradictory to the Constitution.
Whether the Constitutional Court has the authority of suspending the execution of
an administrative act is a controversial issue since the Code on Establishment and Rules
of Procedures of the Constitutional Court does not explicitly authorize the Court to do
so. However, Article 125 of the Constitution which is titled “Judicial Review” states as
follows: “A justified decision regarding the suspension of execution of an administrative
act may be issued, should its implementation result in damages which are difficult or
impossible to compensate for and, at the same time, the act would be clearly unlawful”
(Const. of the Republic of Turkey, amend. 2011, art. 125). By giving reference to this
article, the Constitutional Court suspended the execution of an administrative act for
the first time on October 21, 1993, and the jurisprudence on suspension of executive
has been built thereupon.
The Constitutional Court is also responsible for resolving cases related to the func-
tioning of the political parties. Two types of cases the Constitutional Court is authorized
to resolve are passing a warning to political parties and banning them. Only the Chief
Prosecutor of the Republic at the Supreme Court of Appeals can lodge an action to ban
a political party, and can address the Court regarding the ruling for a warning against a
political party upon the claim that it has acted in violation of certain provisions of the
Political Parties Code. Following the Constitutional Court’s controversial rulings on
party closures, lodging action to ban political parties has been made more difficult and
the required portion of the Court members to ban political parties has been increased.
The Court is also authorized to financially audit the political parties with help from
the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Accounts.
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The bill of constitutional amendment allowing the abolition of TBMM deputies’ leg-
islative immunity and foreclosure of their membership is adopted on May 2016, with the
votes of more than three-fifths majority of the total number of members of the Assem-
bly (i.e., without a need for a referendum.) Before 2016, assembly members’ immunity
from interrogation could not be abolished, thus such a type had not existed. Now the
Constitutional Court also accepts the applications of deputies who claim that the abo-
lition of their legislative immunity or foreclosure of their membership is in violation of
the Constitution. The last type of cases the Constitutional Court hears is individual
application the right of which is granted to the citizens with the 2010 Constitutional
Amendments. This matter is briefly explained below.
With the 2010 Constitutional Amendment, the structure, duties, and authorities
of the Constitutional Court have been rearranged. The composition of the Court, the
tenure of justices, and the scope of the applications to the Court have been changed
with the Amendment. To start with the composition of the Court, while the initial
arrangement of 1982 declared the Constitutional Court to be composed of eleven regular
and four substitute members, the amendment increased the number of regular members
to seventeen and abolished the seats reserved to the substitute members. Article 146
of the 1982 Constitution prescribed the composition of the Court as follows:
“The President of the Republic shall appoint two regular and two substi-
tute members from the High Court of Appeal, two regular and one substitute
member from the Council of State; and one member each from the Military
High Court of Appeal the High Military Administrative Court and the Au-
dit Court, three candidates being nominated for each vacant office by the
Plenary Assemblies of each court from among their respective presidents
and members, by an absolute majority of the total number of members;
the President of the Republic shall also appoint one member from a list of
three candidates nominated by the Council of Higher Education from among
members of the teaching staff of Institutions of higher education who are
not members of the Council, and three members and one substitute member
from among senior administrative officers and lawyers.”
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Table 3 The Change in the Composition of the Constitutional Court
Members 1982 Constitution 2010 Amendment
Elected by the President
High Court of Appeals 2 R + 2 S 3 R
Council of State 2 R + 1 S 2 R
Court of Accounts 1 R
High Military Court of Appeals 1 R 1 R
High Military Administrative Court 1 R 1 R
Teaching Staff in Higher Education 1 R 3 R
Senior Administrative Officers and Lawyers 3 R + 1 S 4 R
Elected by the Parliament
Court of Accounts 2 R
Heads of Bar Associations 1 R
Total 11 R + 4 S 17 R
Note: R: Regular Member; S: Substitute Member.
Article 146 of the 1982 Constitution, as amended on September 12, 2010; Act No. 5982,
prescribes the composition of the Court as follows:
“The Constitutional Court shall be composed of seventeen members. The
Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall elect, by secret ballot, two mem-
bers from among three candidates to be nominated by and from among the
president and members of the Court of Accounts, for each vacant position,
and one member from among three candidates nominated by the heads of
the bar associations from among self-employed lawyers. ... The President of
the Republic shall appoint three members from High Court of Appeals, two
members from Council of State, one member from the High Military Court
of Appeals, and one member from the High Military Administrative Court
from among three candidates to be nominated, for each vacant position, by
their respective general assemblies, from among their presidents and mem-
bers; three members, at least two of whom being law graduates, from among
three candidates to be nominated for each vacant position by the Council
of Higher Education from among members of the teaching staff who are not
members of the Council, in the fields of law, economics and political sciences;
four members from among high level executives, self-employed lawyers, first
category judges and public prosecutors or rapporteurs of the Constitutional
Court.”
Table 3 summarizes the composition of the Court as it is prescribed in 1982 Consti-
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tution before and after the 2010 Amendment. According to Provisional Article 18 of the
Act No. 5982, existing four substitute members were to become regular members, and
two new justices (one from the Court of Accounts and one from among the heads of bar
associations) were to be appointed by the Parliament immediately after the Amend-
ment came into force. Since the total number of members who will be elected from
the High Court of Appeals was reduced from four to three, and members who will be
elected from the Council of State was reduced from three to two, following the vacancy
of the positions allocated to the High Court of Appeals and the Council of State, the
President was to choose one member for each vacancy, from among three candidates to
be nominated by the Council of Higher Education from among members of the teaching
staff in Higher Education.
Another rearrangement in the structure of the Constitutional Court concerns Jus-
tices’ tenure. While the 1982 Constitution stated that “the members of the Constitu-
tional Court shall retire on reaching the age of sixty five” (Const. of the Republic of
Turkey, amend. 1987, art. 147), the same article is amended as follows: “The members
of the Constitutional Court shall be elected for a term of twelve years. A member shall
not be re-elected. The members of the Constitutional Court shall retire when they are
over the age of sixty-five” (Const. of the Republic of Turkey, amend. 2011, art. 147).
In other words, while the only term limit had been justices’ age before the amendment,
now they were to serve only for twelve years. Those justices who were members of
the Constitutional Court on the date of entry into force of the Act No. 5982, were to
continue in their post until the statutory age limit.
2010 Amendment also provided individuals with the right to a remedy that can be
exercised following the exhaustion of other remedies. Upon the claim that a lower Court
violated her constitutional rights, an individual could, after the Amendment, resort to
the Constitutional Court by filing an individual application. This reform proposal had
been one of the primary reasons for the amendment package to attract great support
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from the academicians, journalists, and several international organizations. This op-
portunity could put an end to, or at least constitute a constitutional check on, public
authorities’ violations of individuals’ fundamental rights.
Changes in the composition of the Constitutional Court is regarded less radical than
that of the HCJP since the majority of the members continue to be appointed either
directly (the President may choose any justice from among a specific subgroup) or
indirectly (the President may choose one justice from among three candidates proposed
by the high courts) by the President. However, with the total increase in the number of
the court members from 11 to 17, and the parliament being granted a limited role in the
appointment of justices, a significant change in court decisions was a high probability.
Besides, the radical change in the structure and the composition of the HCJP would
most likely reflect in the Composition of the Constitutional Court in the long run.
Though the Provisional Article 18 ruled that only two new members were to be
appointed to the Court upon the amended articles’ entry into force, the designated
dates of retirement for three regular (Sacit Adali, March 2010; Abdullah Necmi Ozler,
April 2010; Sevket Apalak, November 2010) and two substitute (Cafer Sat, January
2010; Mustafa Yildirim, February 2010)13 members were already within 2010. For this
reason, the Constitutional Court was to welcome seven new members in one year. With
Recep Komurcu whom the President Gul appointed to the Court in 2008, the number
of Gul appointees were to become 8 to 9 in late 2010-early 2011, and 10 to 7 in early
2012.
The increase in the number of Gul appointees within the Court would be lower if the
number of Court members were stuck to eleven regular and four substitute members.
For this reason, debates on the change in the Court’s composition have revolved around
whether the reforms implied “court packing.” Scholars were divided into two camps
arguing either that the amendments would lead to the enlargement of the Constitutional
13A full list of justices’ dates of entry and exit is provided in Table 11 of the Appendix.
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Court, allowing it to be filled with conservative judges who would be more in tune with
the AKP’s conservative agenda (Kalaycioglu, 2012, p. 6) or that “the amendments
opened avenues of appointment and advancement to a broader cross-section of the
Turkish judiciary” (Bali, 2011-12, p. 309). Apparently, differing emphases on the change
in the substantive representativeness of the Court and the intention with which its
representativeness was altered seem to have determined these two camps’ positions
towards the reforms.
In a way to support the arguments in favor of the reforms, the Constitutional Court
ruled against the incumbent government’s interests in several key cases since 2010. One
of the most controversial rulings of the Court was its unconstitutionality decision of
the aforementioned bill that transferred the powers of the Plenary of the HCJP to the
Minister of Justice. An equally polemical ruling was the one that led to the release
of journalists Can Du¨ndar and Erdem Gu¨l who have been charged with publishing
classified governmental information. Following this seemingly activist attitude of the
Court, some scholars’ portrayal of it as “the principal defender of human rights and
democratic standards” (Ozbudun, 2015a, p. 7) and the reforms as “an important step
in the direction of improved fundamental rights, judicial accountability and civilian
control over government” (Bali, 2011-12, p. 309) can be argued to have gained meaning.
Furthermore, the Court received severe criticisms from the ranks of the government
and AKP representatives. Then Prime Minister Erdogan accused justices of involving
in politics and invited them to take-off their robes and engage in politics.14 An AKP
parliamentarian even demanded the abolishment of the Constitutional Court claiming
that appointed justices assume judicial guardianship over elected deputies.15 In few
years, as part of the broad purge on the state bureaucracy including judges and public
14Cumhuriyet, April 13, 2014. “Take off your robe and engage in politics.” Consulted on June 27,
2018
15Hurriyet, March 13, 2016. “Constitutional Court should be abolished.”
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ gundem/anayasa-mahkemesi-kaldirilmali-40067785 Consulted on
June 27, 2018
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prosecutors, two judges from the Constitutional Court were charged with being members
of the Gulen Movement, and imprisoned immediately after the July 15 coup attempt.
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3 DATASET
In this chapter, I briefly review the data compilation efforts for the empirical study of
judicial behavior, explain the coding procedure and the operationalization of the justice
ideology employed in the empirical analyses of this study, and then provide an overview
of the dataset.
3.1 Databases on Courts
With the rigid and doctrine-centered legal formalism of the 1800s leaving its place to
legal realism in the early twentieth century, a more flexible style of legal scholarship that
is “attentive to policy, politics, and the law-in-action of self-regulating social communi-
ties (Suchman and Mertz, 2010, p. 558)” has become prominent. This flexible style of
scholarship approaches the law as a construct of lawmaker and adjudicator, and social,
political and economic factors as important determinants both in the making and in
the adjudicating of law. Expectedly, the expansion of legal scholarship to the students
of sociology, political science, psychology and economics also follows this major shift in
literature.
Once theoretical developments in these areas had achieved the threshold of mat-
uration, questions that would yield to empirical testing have emerged (Heise, 2002,
p. 820), and empirical studies gained ground among legal academists. While early em-
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pirical work in legal research relied heavily on qualitative surveys of judicial decisions,
the first scholar to rely on empirical data to support a hypothesis was Pritchett, a po-
litical scientist from the University of Chicago. In early 1940s, he started tallying the
votes of the United States Supreme Court in order to test the hypothesis that justices’
votes are not mere reflections of the existing law but determined by their individual
preferences, most important of them being their ideologies. Pritchett also showed the
ideological groupings within the Court and place the justices on the left-right spectrum
using matrices and descriptive statistics without resorting to the more advanced tools
at our disposal today.
Pritchett’s project of collecting quantitative data on the US Supreme Court cases
has inspired many scholars to build similar datasets on the Supreme Court, and other
national and international higher courts. First among them was in late 1980s, when
Spaeth initiated a comprehensive justice-level dataset collection, and the dataset is
publicized ever since under the name of Supreme Court Database (SCDB).16 The current
SCDB offers two definitive datasets, the so-called Modern and Legacy Databases, the
former including the terms between 1946 and 2016, and the latter between 1791 and
1945. These two databases are definitive in that they provide almost all information
found in the script of a case. To illustrate, the Modern Database consists of two main
datasets, one is case-centered data with its unit of analysis being case, and the other is
justice-centered data with its unit of analysis being justice. The former only includes
case-related information such as the origin and source of the case, the reason the Court
agreed to consider it, legal provisions, issues, direction of decision, disposition of the
case, winning party and alike, whereas the latter -in addition to all those variables
the case-centered dataset contains- also provides information on each justice’s vote and
opinion for each case. It stands as the most extensive database ever compiled on a court
and attracts unceasing attention from both academic and non-academic researchers.
16Available on: http://supremecourtdatabase.org Consulted on June 27th, 2018
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Another major data compilation project is the U.S. Appeals Courts Database Project
initially directed by Songer in mid-1990s.17 Though also extensive in its scope, the U.S.
Appeals Courts Database is not as definite as that of the Supreme Court, since it relies
on a random sample of cases between 1925 and 2002. Given the great number of cases
heard so far, the project initiators seem to have desired to catch the trends over time,
rather than an absolute depiction of the Courts in a shorter term. Contrarily, the State
Supreme Court Data Project, directed by Hall and Brace, contains data covering a
shorter time period but is definitive in terms of its scope. It provides information on
state Supreme Court decisions in all fifty states of the U.S. between 1995 and 1998.18
Starting with early 2000s, both data collection initiatives and the related scholar-
ship on judicial politics have stepped up. With near to absolute information on the
U.S. high courts had been made available, scholars turned their attention to inter-
national and other national high courts. With regard to the data collection efforts on
overseas countries in the U.S., the National High Courts Judicial Database (HCJD) pro-
vides justice-level information about eleven countries’ highest courts.1920Within HCJD,
whether the coded information on the content of the cases is universal or relies on a
randomly drawn sample depends on the specificities the country’s apex court i.e. since
when it operates and how many cases it has heard so far.
There have also been individual efforts of data collection on the national high courts.
Latin American courts seem to predominate the studies in that area. Helmke (2002)
and Iaryczower’s (2002) works on Argentina, and Staton’s (2006) works on Mexican
17Available on: http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm Consulted on June 27, 2018
18Available on: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/ pbrace/statecourt/ Consulted on June 27, 2018
19Data on the following countries are available in HCJD: Australia (1969-2003), Canada (1969-
2003), India (1970-2000), Namibia (1990-1998), Philippines (1970-2003), South Africa (Supreme Court
of Appeal, 1970-2000; and Constitutional Court, 1995-2000), Tanzania (1983-1998), United Kingdom
(1970-2002), United States (1953-2005), Zambia (1973-1997), Zimbabwe (1989-2000).
20Haynie, S. L., Sheehan, R. S., Songer, D. R. and Tate, C. N. 2007. High Courts Judicial Database.
Accessed via the University of South Carolina Judicial Research Initiative (www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri
Consulted on June 27, 2018).
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Supreme Court are among the individual efforts to collect votes of Latin American
apex court justices. To count the published studies using justice-level data on the courts
from outside the U.S. or Latin America, Georg Varberg’s (2001) works on the German
Constitutional Court, Songer and Johnson’s (2007) work on the Supreme Court of
Canada, Eisenberg and colleagues’ (2012) work on the Israel Supreme Court, Ramseyer
and colleagues’ (2001) work on the Japanese Supreme Court, and Robinson’s (2013)
work on the Indian Supreme Court are among the well-known quantitative analyses of
judicial decision-making.
On international courts, Voeten’s (2008) data on the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR), Posner and de Figueiredo’s (2004) data on the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), Meernik’s (2003) data on International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), and Carruba and
Gabel’s (2012) data on the European Court of Justice (ECJ) provide extensive justice-
level information as well. Each of these dataset formed the basis for a prominent
study and helped increase our knowledge of judicial behavior in international level. In
addition to usual interest from comparativists, international courts justices’ votes and
cases held by those courts in general have also attracted attention from international
relations scholars. This is understandable given the dyadic information these datasets
provide -nationality of the justice and the government accused of a certain crime- and
the content of the cases usually being a matter of transnational interest.
Though such efforts started to be seen considerably later than aforementioned
projects, empirical studies on the Turkish Constitutional Court have been relying in-
creasingly more on different sorts of quantitative data in the last decade. Not only works
such as Belge’s (2006), providing descriptive statistics on the Court’s case conclusions,
have increased in number, but many scholars also use case- and justice-level coded data
as part of their works. Hazama’s (2012) article has been the first published work us-
ing case-level coded data for empirical analysis and was influential for the subsequent
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studies. Aydın’s (2012) dissertation used another extensive case-level coded data to
assess Court decisions. Moral and Tokdemir’s (2016) work has been the first to collect
justice-level data and investigated whether justices vote ideologically in party closure
cases. Yildirim and colleagues (2017) also rely on a justice-level coded dataset. In their
work, not justice’s votes for the constitutionality of the provision at hand are coded
1 (or 0, for that matter), but whether the decision was in accordance with the state-
elites’ interest is coded 1. Lastly, Varol’s (2017) recent article also relies on justice-level
coded data from 200 randomly drawn cases. It is important to note here that none of
these datasets have yet been made publicly available and that all authors compiled their
respective datasets with regard to the necessities of their research question at hand.
3.2 Coding Procedure
The dataset I used in this study builds on Moral and Tokdemir’s (2016) justice-level
data on the CCT decisions. In order to update their data which consisted of 2870 cases
CCT had heard between 1982 and 2011, I coded 1660 additional cases from 2011 to the
end of 2016. For the cases brought to the CCT by opposition parties (i.e., actions for
annulment) after the incumbent party AKP came into power in 2002, I used different
coding rules, and also compiled more information on those cases’ content. Lastly, I
also updated the background information of justices appointed after 2011 to be able to
account for other possible determinants of justices’ behavior.
I referred the “Database of Legal Provisions” on the official website21 of the CCT
as the source for the coding of the CCT cases. This website provides full scripts of all
cases published by the Resmi Gazete22 since 1982, which corresponds to the date of the
current Constitution entering into force. The cases are broken into five categories with
regard to their content: 1) Action for annulment/Remedy of objection 2) Suspension
21http://anayasa.gov.tr/icsayfalar/kararlar/kbb.html
22Resmi Gazete is the official newspaper in which the Grand Turkish National Assembly’s new
legislations and the cases held in high courts are pronounced.
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Table 4 Number of cases by case content and decision date
1982-9 1990-9 2000-9 2010-6 Total
Action for annulment/Remedy of objection 221 610 991 917 2739
Financial supervision of political parties - 124 294 491 909
Suspension of execution - 42 97 20 159
Passing a warning to political parties 12 36 27 6 81
Banning of political parties (Party closure) 8 17 15 1 41
Total 241 829 1424 1435 3929
of execution 3) Banning of political parties (party closure) 4) Financial supervision
of political parties and 5) Passing a warning to political parties. These categories
are explained in the second chapter under the section of Constitutional Court. The
dataset includes information on justices’ votes on the universe of the cases in these five
categories. Table 4 shows the number of cases in our data falling into each category.
The only category on which we have not yet coded any data is individual applications
– the right of which is granted to every citizen of the Republic of Turkey with the 2010
Constitutional Amendment.
The original dataset of Moral and Tokdemir includes one set of justice votes for
each dispute. Cases with multiple issues or legal provisions appear only once. In other
words, each row stands for a justice’s decision in a given case. In this dataset, a justice’s
decision is coded 1 if she accepted the unconstitutionality claim of the complainant for
any of the legal provisions within a case, and her decision is coded 0 if she rejected
the unconstitutionality claim for all legal provisions within a case. Therefore, each row
answers the question of “did she accepted complainant’s unconstitutionality claim in
case number (let’s say) 2016/85?”
I recoded all action for annulment cases between 2002 and 2016 since I will be using
those cases as my dependent variable. For this time period, action for annulment cases
are the cases opened by opposition parties and almost all of them by the Republican
People’s Party. This dataset houses one set of justice votes for each legal provision
within a dispute. Cases with multiple issues or legal provisions thus appear multiple
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Figure 1: Conclusion of an Annulment Action Case (No. 2008/79)
times in the sample. Differently from the original dataset, a justice’s decision is coded
1 if she accepted the unconstitutionality claim of the complainant for a legal provision
within a case, and 0 if she rejected the unconstitutionality claim for that legal provi-
sion within the case. Therefore, each row answers the question of “did she accepted
complainant’s unconstitutionality claim in the (let’s say) second legal provision of case
number 2016/85?” I also coded relevant chronological (i.e. the date of litigation and
decision) and background information (i.e. which political party opened the case) on
these cases.
Figure 1 provides an example of the conclusion of an annulment action case (No.
2008/79) heard on March 11, 2008. It includes three legal provisions within a single
case, and some justices voted differently for these legal provisions. The first legal
provision rules with majority vote that the code of concern should be annulled. Osman
Alifeyyaz Paksut, Fulya Kantarcioglu, Mehmet Erten, A. Necmi Ozler, Sevket Apalak,
and Zehra Ayla Perktas voted in favor of the annulment of the code. In other words,
they found the code unconstitutional and voted for the unconstitutionality of the AKP
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legislation. Hasim Kilic, Sacit Adali, Ahmet Akyalcin, Serdar Ozguldur, and Serruh
Kaleli, on the other hand, voted against the annulment of the code. They found the
code constitutional, voted against the unconstitutionality of the AKP legislation and
dissented the majority vote in favor of the annulment. The second provision rules with
majority vote against the annulment of the code of concern. Only Sevket Apalak voted
for the unconstitutionality, in other words, he dissented the majority vote against the
annulment. The third provision was ruled unanimously against the unconstitutionality.
Moral and Tokdemir’s original dataset (Moral, 2016) provides one set of justice votes
for this case, i.e., one column is reserved as representative of this case. Justices vot-
ing for the unconstitutionality (Osman Alifeyyaz Paksut, Fulya Kantarcioglu, Mehmet
Erten, A. Necmi Ozler, Sevket Apalak and Zehra Ayla Perktas) are coded 1, and those
voting against the unconstitutionality (Hasim Kilic, Sacit Adali, Ahmet Akyalcin, Ser-
dar Ozguldur and Serruh Kaleli) are coded 0. The dataset on the annulment action
cases which I coded in order to use as the dependent variable in the empirical analyses,
provides three sets of justice votes for this case – i.e., each column corresponds to a
single legal provision. In short, this dataset houses all legal provisions including the
ones the conclusions of which are reached with unanimous vote as the third provision
shows. It is however important to note here that the decisions made unanimously are
coded as “procedural” and excluded from the limited sample employed in robustness
checks.
3.3 Operationalization of Justice Ideology
For this study, I operationalized justice ideology as a measure of justices’ ideal points,
also known as NOMINATE Common Space scores developed by Poole and Rosenthal
(1997). Ideal points are measured using a scaling algorithm that takes a set of issue
scales (e.g., Legislators’ vote for a bill of law, justices’ vote for a case) in order to mea-
sure latent quantities positioning issues on a common space (Armstrong and Rosenthal,
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2014). In other words, it employs a scaling algorithm to provide a spatial map, which
help us position voters, candidates, or respondents with regard to their ideology, religios-
ity, and alike. This procedure of estimating latent quantities out of observed indicators
is commonly accepted as a reliable and valid measurement strategy for placing justices
on both unidimensional and multidimensional ideology space (Epstein and Westerland,
2007), and also used by several scholars to map CCT justices on a political space (Moral
and Tokdemir, 2017; Yildirim and Gulener, 2017; Varol and Garoupa, 2017).
As it will we elaborated more in the next chapter, I would like to measure the
impact of justices’ ideology on their votes in annulment action cases between 2002
and 2016. In other words, I will use justices votes in annulment action cases as the
dependent variable, and justices’ ideal points as the independent variable. For this
reason, I measured justices’ ideal points using the universe of cases except for the
annulment action cases. Cases of remedy of objection, financial supervision or political
parties, suspension of execution, passing a warning to political parties and banning of
political parties23 (the case-justice dyad level dataset of Moral and Tokdemir) are used
to measure justices’ ideal points, and annulment action cases (the legal provision-justice
level dataset I coded) will be used as the dependent variable on which we will measure
23Differences in these cases are explained in the first chapter.
Figure 2: Justices’ α-NOMINATE Positions before and after 2010 Constitutional
Amendment
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the effect of ideology.
I used the α-NOMINATE package (Carroll and Rosenthal, 2013) in the R Project for
Statistical Computing to estimate justices’ ideal points. I follow the previous literature
in assuming that the political space in Turkey is multidimensional (Carkoglu and Hinich,
2006; Schofield and Zakharov, 2011; Moral and Tokdemir, 2017). In other words, this
study assumes that the space in which the CCT justices operate is two-dimensional.
α-NOMINATE scaling algorithm provides two continuous variables, which allow us to
position justices on a two-dimensional space. Labeling these dimensions, however, has
to be a matter of researcher’s theoretical expectations. Previous research and prior
knowledge on the political space of Turkey has identified religiosity and nationalism
as underlying dimensions, thus labeled the first as the liberal-conservative, or secular-
islamist dimension, and the second as the activist-restrainst, or the pro-Kurdish-anti-
Kurdish dimension (Mardin, 1975; Erguder, 1980-81; Kalaycioglu, 1994; Esmer, 2002;
Carkoglu and Hinich, 2006; Moral and Tokdemir, 2017).
Drawing on Moral and Tokdemir’s study, I refer to the first ideological dimension as
the liberal-conservative dimension, and the second ideological dimension as the activist
(anti-status quo)-restrainist (pro-status quo) dimension. I take the classical liberal-
conservative dimension to account for justices’ tendency to favor conservative govern-
ments’ legislation, regardless of the presidents by whom they were appointed. The sec-
ond dimension capture individual justices’ tendency to favor state ideology, or military-
bureaucratic elites’ interest. In the most general sense, I expect the justices appointed
after 2010 to score higher on the first dimension (i.e., to fall closer to the conservative
pole), and to score lower on the second dimension (i.e., to fall closer the anti-status
quo pole). Figure 2 shows how the justices’ ideal point estimates are dispersed in the
two-dimensional space when divided according to their date of appointment.
It is important to note here that what the NOMINATE model actually provides is
the distances between the points and not the exact coordinates where the points fall on
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a line or plane. As such, the polarity dimension used to determine the common space
scores is chosen arbitrarily. In other words, while measuring the scores, one of the
two poles on each dimension needs to be specified by the researcher so that the other
points’ distances to the poles can be scaled. In order to determine the poles of the
two dimensions, I use Hasim Kilic (for the liberal-conservative dimension) and Osman
Alifeyyaz Paksut (for the activist-restrainst dimension) to define polarity. Before doing
Figure 3: Justices’ α-NOMINATE Positions by Appointed President
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so, I estimated two-dimensional α-NOMINATE scores using different sets of justices
and checked whether CCT’s compositional change might have necessitated doing so.
More than any others, I questioned whether I should draw on Moral and Tokdemir’s
study to take Hasim Kilic and M. Yilmaz Aliefendioglu to define polarity dimensions,
but I decided to replace Aliefendioglu with Paksut in order to have the set of justices
that served within the time period I will use as my dependent variable (2002-2016).
Moreover, the α-NOMINATE estimates based on the polarity defined by Hasim Kilic
and Osman Alifeyyaz Paksut seem to provide a good fit to the data, too. This is under-
standable, considering how distinct dissenting patterns these two justices show in their
votes. That is also what Moral and Tokdemir mentioned in the Supplementary Ap-
pendix of their study to take into consideration while choosing the polarity dimensions.
In addition, Hasim Kilic was appointed by Turgut Ozal and Osman Alifeyyaz Paksut
was appointed by Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the former leading the center-rightist movement
in 1980s and the latter himself being a former member of the CCT, appointed by Kenan
Evren, who led the 1980 military coup against the government, and had a direct impact
in the making of the 1982 Constitution.
Figure 3 illustrates how justices’ ideal points differ with regard to the Presidents
appointing them, and the lines in each box stand for the mean position on each ide-
ological dimension. The differences in these mean α-NOMINATE ideology estimates
are statistically significantly different than zero at 95% confidence level. Evidently,
the presidents have appointed ideologically distinguishable justices. While the justices
Sezer appointed have been restrainist and liberal, those Gul appointed have been highly
conservative and relatively more activist. One cannot help but wonder whether these
ideological positions, in return, determine how justices vote in the existing governments’
legislation. If this is the case, we may have reason to infer that, through their power to
appoint justices, the presidents indirectly take part in the law-making process.
Lastly, justices’ α-NOMINATE scores are estimated from votes on cases between
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1982 and 2016 excluding the annulment action cases. The estimates are only available
for those 59 justices who voted on at least 20 constitutional review cases between these
years. The measures correctly predict 76.5% of “yes” and 85% of “no” votes and classify
77.14% and 81.21% of the justices’ ideal points. Figure 4 illustrates the annually change
in the median and mean justices’ ideological positioning from 1985 to 2016. On the
activist restrainist dimension, though the ideological positioning seems to have always
been fluctuating between the two extremes, starting with early 2000s until 2010, a
considerable lean towards the restrainist pole is evident. Between 2010 and 2016, on
the contrary, the Court seems to have driven to the other extreme, and last few years
demonstrated an activist attitude. On the liberal conservative dimension, the Court
seems to have always been leaning slightly towards the liberal pole until the first few
years of Gul’s presidency. After the reforms of the judiciary, however, it seems to have
been increasingly conservatized and in last years it reached to a level that has never
been seen in the Court’s history.
The sharp transformations of 2010s could easily be attributed to the court-packing
act initiated with the 2010 Constitutional Amedment. In a way, the figure depicts how
the CCT has been impacted by the ongoing discussions revolving around preserving
or overcoming the Kemalist state-ideology. It requires further tests, however, to infer
whether this ideological transformation of the Court has significantly impacted justices’
votes in annulment action cases, or whether there has been a significant change after
2010 on the probability that they vote for the annulment of newly enacted laws.
3.4 Overview of the Dataset
In regard to the dependent variable, there are 274 annulment actions lodged to the CCT
between 2002 and 2016, and there are 1,873 conclusions in these cases. Since my unit of
analysis is justice-conclusion, the number of observations is 1,873 times the number of
justice vote for each conclusion, which equals to 26689. Table 5 illustrates justices’ yay
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Figure 4: Change in the Median and Mean Justices’ Ideological Positioning
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and nay votes for the constitutionality of the AKP legislation grouped by the date of
conclusion and by justices’ appointment date, and Table 6 illustrates those grouped by
the Presidents by whom the justices were appointed. By specifying if majority voted for
or against the government, these tables also show the dissenting behavior of individual
justices and the outcome of the conclusion.
According to the Table 5, after the 2010 Constitutional Amendment, justices votes
in favor of the government had increased near to 10% when the majority voted for
the government (i.e., when the Court rejected the annulment of the AKP legislation).
Likewise, justices’ votes in favor of the government have almost doubled when major-
ity voted against the government i.e., when the Court accepted the annulment action
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of the opposition parties. Comparing justices’ votes appointed before and after the
2010 Amendment provides more striking findings. Those who were appointed after the
Amendment have 10% more frequently voted against the annulment action when the
majority rejected it, and they have three times more frequently dissented against the
annulment of the AKP legislation. Difference in dissenting pattern of justices appointed
by different presidents is also worthy of further notice. As seen in Table 6, the justices
appointed by Gul and Erdogan vote more than 10 percent more frequently in favor of
the AKP legislation, regardless of the direction of majority vote. As is seen in Table 6,
the justices appointed by Gu¨l and Erdog˘an are more than 10% more likely to vote in
favor of AKP’s legislation, regardless of the direction of majority vote.
These simple statistics hint at that when majority rejects an annulment, they do
so with a stronger support within the Court, and when the majority accepts it, dissent
against it is now greater. These differences are statistically significant at p = .001 and
give reason to test the hypothesis that the Court’s compositional change significantly
altered the decisions it makes. Yet the table also clearly shows that the CCT justices
had not always voted for the rejection of political parties’ annulment actions after 2010,
decisions against the government’s legislation have continued to be made. However, it
seems that justices’ incentive to dissent, in other words, the opposition among the CCT
have weakened.
Table 7 illustrates the dependent and independent variables in my dataset and
presents the descriptive statistics. To go over the independent variables employed in
the empirical analyses in the following chapters, it seems that both the range and the
standard deviation of the 1st dimension, which we labeled as “Activist-Restrainist,”
almost doubles that of the second, which is the so-called “Liberal-Conservative” dimen-
sion. It may amount to a greater divergence among justices in terms of their activism
against “hegemonic preservation” than their devotion to the values of liberalism or
conservatism.
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Vote for Annulment Action 26689 .246 .430 0 1
Dissent against Majority 26689 .08 .270 0 1
1st Dimension (α-NOMINATE) 26689 .173 .895 -2.128 2.164
2nd Dimension(α-NOMINATE) 26689 .273 .535 -.967 .895
Military Background 26689 .178 .382 0 1
Education Level 26689 1.612 .863 1 3
Law Graduate 26689 .741 .438 0 1
Years of Experience 26689 5.875 5.279 0 25
Age when voted 26689 56.271 5.829 42 70
Status of the Justice 26689 1.268 .598 1 3
Duration of a case 26689 1.325 1.049 0 5
Most of the other independent variables are related to justices’ background charac-
teristics. While coding these variables, I used the information provided on the CCT’s
official website. Military background provides information on whether the justice had
served in a martial court before becoming a member of the CCT. Education level con-
notes the latest degree the justices have pursued. Respectively, the variable is coded
1, 2, and 3 if the justice has a B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degree. One justice according
to the 1982 Constitution, and three justices according to the 2010 Amendment can be
appointed from among the members of the Higher Education Council to the CCT by
the presidents without necessary respect to their background in legal scholarship. The
variable “law graduate,” therefore, takes account of whether the justice is a graduate of
the faculty of law or not. Status of the justice gives information on whether the justice
has served as the president, vice-president, or as a member of the CCT.
The remaining variables are generated using the case-level data. Years of Experience
is a measure of the number of years a given justice has served in the CCT by the time
she voted in a case. I generated this variable by subtracting the year of the justice’s
entry to the Court from the year the decision is made. The age variable accounts for
a justice’s age when she voted for any legal provision. I generated this variable by
subtracting justices’ birthyears from the year they voted for any legal provision. Lastly,
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the duration of a case is a measure of the number of years it takes for the CCT to make
a conclusion on a case. I generated this variable by subtracting the year a given case is
filed to the CCT from the year the conclusion is made.
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4 DETERMINANTS OF JUSTICES’ VOTES
AGAINST ACTIONS FOR ANNULMENT
Against “legalistic accounts” which suggest that judges are neutral, principled decision-
makers ruling what laws dictate, “political accounts” approach legal factors generally
as constraints on the multiple factors influencing judicial decisions. Ideology among
those factors has long been argued to have an important, if not central, role in the
studies of judicial decision making (Epstein and Segal, 2012) Several studies provide
empirical evidence showing the effect of ideology on judicial decisions in the US courts
(Epstein and Posner, 2013) and in other countries including Norway (Grendstad and
Shaffer, 2015), Spain (Garoupa and Grembi, 2013), Britain (Iaryczower and Katz, 2016),
France and Germany (Honnige, 2009), as well as in Turkey (Moral and Tokdemir, 2017).
Previous research shows that, regardless of whether it is measured endogenously (i.e.,
based on the decisions justices make within the court) or exogenously (i.e., based on
indicators other than justices’ judicial decisions such as their column articles or lectures),
ideology plays a significant role in justices’ decisions-making calculus.
Following the previous literature, in this chapter, I question the role justices’ ideol-
ogy plays in their votes on the annulment action cases between 2002 and 2016, which
correspond to the period of AKP rule. In other words, I empirically assess the role of
ideology in determining justices’ votes for or against the AKP legislation. I employ two
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probit regression models differing in their dependent variables. While discussing the
findings, I report the results for different groups of cases and justices both in the re-
gression tables and in the figures displaying the predicted probabilities of justices’ votes
1) for the unconstitutionality of AKP legislation and 2) against the majority decision
within the Court. I argue that the CCT justices’ first and second dimension ideology
scores are statistically and substantively significant determinants of their votes and dis-
sents in annulment action cases. In addition, the following background characteristics
are included in both models as control variables: Justice age; whether she had served
as a justice in a military court; the number of years she has served in the CCT; whether
she has served as the president, vice-president or as a member of the CCT; whether
she is a graduate of a Law Faculty or a Faculty of Social Sciences; whether she holds a
B.A., an M.A., or a Ph.D.; the number of years it took for a case to be concluded; and
the year the decision was made. The baseline model is the following:
Pr
( Vote for the Unconstitutionality
of Newly Enacted Laws
)
=
β0 + β1Ideology (1) + β2Ideology (2)
+ β3Military Background + β4Position
+ β5Education + β6Age + β7Faculty
+ β8Experience + β9Case Length+ β10Year + µ
where justice ideology stands as the primary independent variable and measure justices’
latent ideological attitudes using of two-dimensional α-NOMINATE ideal-point esti-
mates on the liberal-conservative and activist (anti-status quo)-restrainist (pro-status
quo) dimensions as explained in Chapter 3. While the independent variables are the
same for all models, the dependent variable of the second model is dissent against the
majority vote as mentioned above.
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4.1 Voting for Unconstitutionality
Hypothesis 1: The more restrainist a justice is, the more likely she will vote for the
unconstitutionality of AKP legislation.
Hypothesis 2: The more conservative a justice is, the less likely she will vote for the
unconstitutionality of AKP legislation.
The first and second hypotheses investigate whether justices’ ideologies or background
characteristics determine their votes for the unconstitutionality of the AKP legislation.
As Table 8 illustrates the regression output of the model, both the liberal-conservative
and activist-restrainist dimensions’ estimates are statistically significant at 99% con-
fidence level and in the expected directions. Since the coefficient of justices’ first
dimension α-NOMINATE score is positive and the second dimension is negative, we
understand that the increase in the former increases the predicted probability of voting
against AKP legislation and the latter decreases it. In other words, on the activist-
restrainist dimension, the more restrainist a justice is, the more likely she will vote for
the unconstitutionality of AKP legislation, and on the liberal-conservative dimension,
the more conservative a justice is, the less likely she will vote for the unconstitutionality
of AKP legislation.
The findings about the cases’ and justices’ background characteristics are also worth
mentioning here. Model 1 shows that the number of years a CCT justice has served
in the court; whether she has served as the president, vice-president, or as a member
of the court; and whether she is a graduate of a law faculty or a faculty of social
sciences are statistically significant determinants of their votes, while whether she was
a justice of a military court before being appointed to the CCT; whether she holds a
B.A., M.A., or Ph.D.; and her age are not significant determinants of their vote for
the unconstitutionality of AKP legislation. As the directions of statistically significant
coefficients suggest, being a law faculty graduate and being a tenured member of the
court (i.e., higher number of years spent in the CCT) increases the predicted probability
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Table 8 Determinants of the CCT Justices’ Votes on the Constitutionality of the AKP Legislation
Vote Dissent
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st Dimension (α-NOMINATE) 0.081*** 0.139** -0.167*** 0.205*** -0.259*** 0.223**
(0.024) (0.058) (0.055) (0.064) (0.077) (0.093)
2nd Dimension (α-NOMINATE) -0.326*** -0.739*** 0.528*** -0.860*** 0.796*** -1.146***
(0.041) (0.090) (0.130) (0.122) (0.189) (0.171)
Military Background -0.055 -0.135 0.474*** 0.047 0.724*** 0.039
(0.042) (0.112) (0.141) (0.165) (0.205) (0.242)
Position in the CCT -0.076*** -0.154** 0.179 -0.145* 0.255 -0.197
(0.025) (0.069) (0.110) (0.084) (0.155) (0.126)
Level of Education 0.034 0.097* -0.078 0.056 -0.176 0.093
(0.022) (0.053) (0.075) (0.071) (0.109) (0.091)
Law Faculty Graduate 0.154*** 0.509*** -0.807*** 0.320** -1.186*** 0.448**
(0.054) (0.121) (0.170) (0.142) (0.229) (0.185)
Years of Experience 0.018*** 0.040*** -0.040** 0.041*** -0.051** 0.060***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.018) (0.008) (0.025) (0.013)
Age 0.004 0.010 -0.006 -0.006 -0.023 -0.001
(0.005) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.026) (0.016)
Length of Case -0.094*** -0.097*** 0.062 -0.028 0.118** -0.034
(0.013) (0.028) (0.038) (0.022) (0.050) (0.030)
Year -0.037*** 0.024** 0.001 0.029* -0.058** 0.046**
(0.006) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.025) (0.021)
Constant 73.922*** -49.160** -2.311 -59.116** 117.828** -93.609**
(11.226) (23.523) (33.812) (30.131) (51.406) (41.805)
Procedural Cases are Included
Majority against Unconstitutionality
N 26689 10043 5812 20877 2451 7592
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.138 0.151 0.139 0.264 0.223
ll -14201.040 -5411.808 -1802.408 -4498.043 -1074.288 -2857.381
Note: Probit regression. Robust standard errors clustered by justices in parentheses. Two tailed tests: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***
p<0.01. Second, fifth, and sixth models report the results for cases excluding the procedural ones. For the models with dissent as
the dependent variable, observations are divided according to the majority vote. Third and fifth models report results for majority
vote against unconstitutionality.
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Figure 5: The Effects of the First and Second Dimension α-NOMINATE Scores on the
Probability of Voting for the Unconstitutionality of the AKP Legislation (Model I)
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of voting against AKP legislation, whereas being the president of the Court decreases
the predicted probability of voting against the AKP legislation.
I plot the effects of the first and second dimension α-NOMINATE scores on the pre-
dicted probabilities of justices’ votes against the unconstitutionality of AKP legislation
in Figure 5. While the predicted probability of a restrainist justice (when the first di-
mension is equal to 2) to vote against AKP legislation is 28.8%, an activist justice votes
against it with a predicted probability of 18.2% (first dimension=-2). In other words,
a restrainist justice is 10% more likely than an activist justice to vote against the AKP
legislation. The difference between the two extremes of the second dimension is greater
in terms of justices’ propensity to vote against unconstitutionality. While the most
conservative justice (second dimension=1) would vote against AKP legislation with an
estimated probability of 17.2%, the most liberal justice would vote against it with an
estimated probability of 36.5%. Moreover, the standard errors of the predictions for the
second dimension are smaller compared to those from the first dimension.
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Figure 6: Predicted Probability of Voting for the Unconstitutionality of the AKP Leg-
islation (Model I)
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Figure 6 presents the marginal effects of minimum, mean, and maximum values of the
first and second dimension ideology scores on the probability of voting in annulment
actions when all other variables are set to their in-sample mean or mode values. In
other words, it shows nine hypothetical justices on the two dimensional ideology space
and plot their predicted probabilities of voting against AKP legislation. Accordingly,
while a hypothetical justice with the minimum scores in both dimensions (i.e., the
first dimension= -2.12 and the second dimension= -1) would vote against the AKP
legislation with a 14% predicted probability, a hypothetical justice with the maximum
scores in both dimensions (i.e., the first dimension= 2.16 and the second dimension= 1)
would have a 46% predicted probability. In other words, a highly restrainist and liberal
justice has 32% higher probability and is approximately three times more likely than
a highly conservative and activist justice to vote for the unconstitutionality of AKP
legislation in annulment actions.
Lastly, ceteris paribus, Figure 6 shows that the mean justice’s predicted probability
47
of voting for the annulment of new legislations (the first dimension= .02 and the second
dimension= 0) is 28%. However, this figure changes substantively when we group
justices with regard to the presidents who appointed them. As Figure 15 in the appendix
shows, ceteris paribus, the predicted probability of voting against AKP legislation is
39% for the mean justice from among those who were appointed by Ahmet Necdet
Sezer, and the predicted probability becomes 27% for a mean justice from among those
who were appointed by Abdullah Gul.
Excluding Procedural Cases
Within my dependent variable, which is justices’ votes for the annulment actions filed
between 2002 and 2016, 16646 observations belong to cases where conclusions were
reached with unanimity, while 10043 observations belong to those that were reached
with at least one dissent. Since the CCT also deal with numerous cases that may not
necessarily require individual justices’ dictum, but are solved with procedural actions,
I also report the findings of Model I for the annulment action cases concluded with
at least one justice’s dissent. I call those cases which were concluded with unanimity
vote as “procedural cases” for the sake of simplicity. Filtering out the procedural cases
helps us measure the impact of justice ideology on AKP legislation when the justices
can reflect their dictum on their votes. Therefore, the following tests are expected to
provide a more precise estimate of justice ideology on their votes.
It is important to note that this approach assumes the cases concluded with una-
nimity vote are procedural without regard to the content of the respective cases. A
drawback to this approach would be the presence of same cases that are not procedural
(i.e., cases that require justices to reflect their dictum rather than merely implement-
ing procedural actions) but are concluded with unanimity vote. Having read the cases
while coding the dependent variable, however, it was quite difficult to find many exam-
ples making this assumption questionable. Expectedly so, it is quite hard for justices
dispersed in a two dimensional ideological space to come to unanimity for the most
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Figure 7: The Effects of the First and Second Dimension α-nominate Scores on the
Probability of Voting for the Unconstitutionality of the AKP Legislation – Procedural
Cases are Excluded (Model II)
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possible ideological cases like opposition parties’ actions for annulment.
Model II in Table 8 presents the findings for actions for annulment cases excluding
the procedural ones. The direction of all variables’ coefficients are the same when
we exclude the procedural cases with that of the regression output when we include
the universe of annulment action cases. Likewise, the first and second dimension α-
NOMINATE estimates, justices’ position within the CCT, whether she is a law faculty
graduate and the number of years of justices’ experience in the CCT are significant
determinants of justices’ votes in the non-procedural annulment action cases at either
95 or 99% confidence levels.
An important difference in the regression outputs for the universe of cases and for
the cases excluding the procedural ones is related to the magnitude of their coefficients.
Since I aim to filter out the cases where justices are assumed to vote in accordance with
the due process of law, I expect to obtain more precise estimates of the effect of first and
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Figure 8: The Predicted Probability of Voting for the Unconstitutionality of the AKP
Legislation – Procedural Cases are Excluded (Model II)
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second dimension α-NOMINATE scores on justices’ votes. More specifically, I expect
the magnitudes of the estimates to be higher (substantively more significant) when the
procedural cases are removed from the sample, and greater magnitude of coefficients in
the second regression output provides evidence for that. In order to show the effect of
α-NOMINATE ideology scores on the annulment action cases excluding the procedural
ones, I plot the predicted probabilities of voting for the unconstitutionality of AKP’s
legislation in Figure 7. As Figure 7 demonstrates, when there is at least one dissent in
the votes of a conclusion, restrainist justices are 20% more likely than activist justices to
vote against AKP legislation, and liberal justices are 42% more likely than conservative
justices. In line with my expectations, when the procedural cases are filtered out from
among the cases filed between 2002 and 2016, the predictive powers of the first and
second dimension ideology scores are much higher.
Figure 8 shows nine hypothetical justices on the two dimensional ideology space and
plot their predicted probabilities of voting against the annulment action cases when the
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procedural ones are excluded from the sample. Accordingly, when there is at least one
dissent in the votes of a conclusion, the most conservative and activist justice would
vote against the unconstitutionality of AKP legislation with 10% predicted probability,
while the most liberal and restrainist justice would vote against AKP legislation with
almost 80% predicted probability. This substantive difference demonstrates both the
importance of ideological preferences in determining justices’ votes in action for annul-
ment cases, and the magnitude of ideological polarization within the CCT. When the
constitutionality of a newly enacted law is disputable; that is, when court members
cannot unanimously accept or reject its unconstitutionality, with 70% probability the
justices in either of the two poles of the ideological space will vote very differently.
Lastly, Figure 16 in Appendix shows how the minimum, mean, and maximum values
of justices’ predicted probabilities of voting on these cases change depending on the
presidents appointed them. While the lowest probability that a hypothetical highly
restrainist and liberal justice appointed by Ahmet Necdet Sezer would vote against an-
nulment action cases (excluding the procedural ones) is 33%, it is 6% for a hypothetical
highly activist and liberal justice appointed by Abdullah Gul. Another interesting point
is regarding the distribution of predicted probabilities among the justices appointed by
either President. While the difference in the predicted probabilities of two hypothetical
justices appointed by Sezer to vote against AKP legislation in these cases is at most
47%, the difference can be as large as 80% for two justices appointed by Gul. Appar-
ently, justices appointed by Gul are more dispersed compared to those appointed by
Sezer in terms of their predicted probabilities of voting.
4.2 Voting against Majority Decision
In a lecture at Columbia University, Charles Evans Hughes, 11th Chief Justice of the
United States, defined dissent in a court of last resort as “an appeal to the brooding
spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possi-
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bly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been
betrayed” Hughes (1928). As the quote unfolds, dissenting behavior in a court of last
resort is valued not only as a mechanism to express a different opinion, but also as a
way to leave a mark in the history, make an influence in the audience, and perhaps
shape forthcoming court decisions. As a result of such an importance attributed by
legal experts and scholars to dissents, dissenting behavior in high courts has become
the subject of several prominent theoretical and empirical studies on high courts of
the United States (Ulmer, 1970; Epstein and Landes, 2011), whereas only Varol and
Garoupa (2017)’s study, which examines a limited number of randomly drawn cases
(i.e., a small subset of the cases examined here), has yet touched upon the dissenting
behavior of the CCT justices. My third and fourth hypotheses attempts to contribute
to this literature.
Hypothesis 3: The more restrainist a justice is, the more likely she will vote against
the majority decision in favor of AKP legislation, and the less likely she will vote against
the majority decision against AKP legislation.
Hypothesis 4: The more conservative a justice is, the less likely she will vote against
the majority decision in favor of AKP legislation, and the more likely she will vote
against the majority decision against AKP legislation.
The third and fourth hypotheses question whether CCT justices’ dissenting behavior
is motivated by their ideological preferences. In order to test these hypotheses, I divide
the sample according to the direction of the majority decision, and assess separately
whether justices’ ideology scores significantly influence their dissenting vote when the
majority decision is in favor of the AKP legislation or against it. The underlying
assumption for dividing the sample according to the majority decision is that since
justices’ vote for or against the AKP legislation is used as the baseline of their dissenting
vote, their predicted probability to dissent should be altered when the majority vote is
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Figure 9: The Effects of the First and Second Dimension α-NOMINATE Scores on the
Probability to Dissent against the Majority Decision (Models III and IV)
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for or against the AKP legislation. To illustrate, I would expect a hypothetical highly
conservative and activist justice to dissent against the majority decision with a high
probability when the majority direction is against the AKP legislation and dissent with
lower probability when it is in favor of the AKP legislation.
Model III and IV in Table 8 reports the probit regression estimates of the determi-
nants of justices’ dissent for the two subgroups. The first and second dimension ideology
scores are statistically significant at 99% confidence level and are in the expected direc-
tions in both types of majority decision. It provides evidence for that the direction of
justices’ dissenting behavior is conditional upon the majority decision. Among justices’
background characteristics, the faculty justices graduated from and their experience
within the CCT are also statistically significant factors influencing their dissenting be-
havior against the majority decision.
In Figure 9, I plot the effects of the first and second dimension α-NOMINATE
ideology scores on the predicted probabilities of dissenting against the majority decision
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in the cases when the majority is in favor of the AKP legislation and when the majority
is against the AKP legislation. Moving from the lowest to the highest levels of the
first dimension ideology score shows an 8% increase in the predicted probabilities of
dissenting when the majority is in favor of the AKP legislation, and 11% decrease when
the majority is against the AKP legislation. On the contrary, moving from the lowest
to the highest levels of second dimension ideology score shows a 24% decrease in the
predicted probabilities of dissenting when the majority is in favor of the AKP legislation,
and 14% increase in the predicted probabilities of dissenting when the majority is against
the AKP legislation. These differences in the predicted probabilities show substantive
and statistical significance. As Table 7 in Chapter 3 presents, the mean of the second
model’s dependent variable is 0.07, therefore even an 8% of difference in the predicted
probabilities between the two poles of each ideological dimension, although it may
seem like an inconsequential amount at first glance, indicates a highly substantively
significant finding.
Figure 9 supports the second hypothesis by providing empirical evidence for that
not only justices’ votes for the unconstitutionality of annulment action cases but also
their dissenting votes against the majority decision are motivated by their ideological
preferences. As Figure 17 in the appendix also illustrates, while the mean justice would
dissent a majority decision in favor of the AKP legislation with 7.7% predicted prob-
ability, a hypothetical restrainist and liberal justice would dissent with %48 predicted
probability. It also reveals how large the ideological polarization within the CCT is. In
light of the empirical evidence, we can thus safely reject the null hypothesis that the
impact of the CCT justices’ ideological preferences on their dissenting behavior is not
statistically significantly distinguishable from zero.
Excluding Procedural Cases
As we did above, here I report the findings from Model II while excluding the procedural
cases from the universe of annulment actions cases, since this approach better reflects
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Figure 10: The Effects of the First and Second Dimension α-NOMINATE Scores on the
Probability to Dissent against the Majority Decision – Procedural Cases are Excluded
(Models V and VI)
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the predictive power of justices’ ideologies for their dissenting behavior. When we
exclude the procedural cases, the mean of the dependent variable of Model II increases
to 0.21, therefore I also expect an increase in the predicted probabilities of dissenting
in annulment action cases in the sample limited to non-procedural cases.
Figure 10 displays the effect of justice ideology on the predicted probabilities of
justices’ dissenting vote, when there is at least one dissenting vote in the conclusion of
a case. Concurrently with my expectations, filtering out the procedural cases from the
sample demonstrates higher predicted probabilities, and the magnitude of the effects of
ideology scores is greater. When the majority decision is in favor of AKP legislation,
the most restrainist justice would dissent with a predicted probability of 25%, and
the most liberal justice would dissent with a 58% predicted probability. When the
majority vote is against AKP legislation, the most activist justice would dissent with
a 42% predicted probability, and the most conservative justice would dissent with 41%
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probability. Lastly, as Figure 18 in the Appendix shows, the mean justice’s predicted
probability to dissent a majority decision in favor of AKP legislation is 22.5%, while
it is 80.5% for a hypothetical restrainist and liberal justice, and 2% for a hypothetical
activist and conservative justice.
This findings became quite striking when we filter the procedural cases from the ob-
servations. Moving from one extreme to the other on the ideology dimensions changes
the predicted probability to dissent vey substantively. The most activist and con-
servative justices almost never dissent against the majority decision in favor of AKP
legislation, while the most restrainist and liberal justices dissent against it very often.
This picture not only provides empirical evidence supporting my hypothesis, it also re-
veals how individual justices can be consistent in dissenting majority decisions in favor
of AKP legislation regardless of the content of the case. Since the CCT justices are
appointed by the presidents of Turkish Republic, one cannot help but wonder whether
presidents knowingly appoint such justices who would consistently avoid dissenting the
majority vote against the unconstitutionality of newly enacted laws. Since all justices
have been appointed by either Gul or Erdogan -both are founding chairmen of the AKP-
after the 2010 Constitutional Amendment, the change in the composition of the CCT
since then may provide us with a beter understanding of this possible pattern. I will
tackle with such questions in the next chapter.
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5 VOTING AGAINST AKP LEGISLATION
BEFORE AND AFTER 2010
The term court-packing was first used to refer to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s plan to increase
the number of Supreme Court justices from 9 to 15 allegedly to make it more “efficient,”
and admittedly to fill the Court with liberal justices who would support his legislation
and outvote the majority (Cushman, 2013). Roosevelt proposed the Judicial Procedures
Reform Bill of 1937 after a series of court decisions against his array of policies known
as the New Deal, therefore his proposal for Judicial Reform was perceived as a threat to
the existing balance in the Court. Though the Congress opposed this reform plan and
it was never initiated, the plan of increasing the number of highest court members so
as to fill it with loyal appointees is described as a form of power grab and “an invasion
of judicial power” (Senate Committee, 1937).
The judicial reforms in Argentina in 1989, in Venezuela in 2004 and in Turkey in
2010 are reported as more recent examples of court-packing. In Argentina, the number
of the members of the Supreme Court of Argentina was increased from five to nine by
President Menem, and in Venezuela, the Congress under Cha´vez expanded the Supreme
Tribunal of Justice from twenty to thirty two members. Both attempts are considered
by scholars (Helmke, 2003; Corrales, 2005) and international organizations (Amnesty
International, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2004) as acts of court-packing as they allowed
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respective presidents to maintain the majority vote within the courts and remove the
obstacle behind their legislation. Similarly in Turkey, for many with a court-packing
plan, AKP government expanded the CCT from eleven to seventeen members with the
2010 Constitutional Amendment. The main arguments for and against the 2010 judicial
reforms are reviewed in Chapter 2. My aim in this chapter will be to empirically assess
the impact of this compositional change.
5.1 Voting for Unconstitutionality
Hypothesis 1: Activist-Restrainist ideology is a significant determinant of justices’
vote against the AKP legislation after the 2010 Constitutional Amendment.
Hypothesis 2: The probability of voting against the AKP legislation was higher before
the 2010 Constitutional Amendment.
The first and second hypotheses investigate the impact of the CCT’s compositional
change on the decisions justices make in annulment action cases. More specifically, I
question whether the effects of the first and second dimension α-NOMINATE scores on
justices’ vote for the unconstitutionality of AKP legislation has changed significantly
over time and as a function of justice ideology. Table 9 presents the probit regression
estimates for the baseline model specified in Chapter 4 before and after the 2010 Consti-
tutional Amendment, and including and excluding the procedural cases. Accordingly,
the first dimension α-NOMINATE estimates are not statistically significant in deter-
mining CCT justices votes before the amendment, while they are significant at 99%
confidence level after the amendment. It suggests that being an activist or restrainist
justice was not a significant predictor of justices’ votes against AKP legislation before
the 2010 Constitutional Amendment. Since the restrainist (pro-status quo) pole in the
first dimension denotes the ideological agenda of preserving the foundational Kemalist
state values, this result suggests that the degree to which justices prefer guarding the
Kemalist state ideology does not predict their votes in annulment action cases between
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2002 and 2010. Between 2010 and 2016, on the other hand, being a restrainist as
opposed to an activist justice increases the probability of voting against the unconsti-
tutionality of AKP legislation. It both provides empirical evidence supporting my first
hypothesis, and shows that ideology gained great importance within the Court after
the amendments.
Table 9 Determinants of CCT Justices’ Votes on the Constitutionality of AKP Legislation
before and after the 2010 Constitutional Amendment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before After Before After
1st Dimension (α-NOMINATE) 0.001 0.076*** -0.059 0.176**
(0.074) (0.028) (0.130) (0.071)
2nd Dimension (α-NOMINATE) -0.251** -0.277*** -0.609*** -0.703***
(0.110) (0.067) (0.218) (0.162)
Military Background -0.068 -0.101 -0.190 -0.270
(0.079) (0.062) (0.155) (0.172)
Position in the CCT -0.040** -0.173*** -0.074 -0.394***
(0.020) (0.048) (0.046) (0.129)
Level of Education -0.001 0.046 0.042 0.122
(0.044) (0.030) (0.089) (0.075)
Law Faculty Graduate 0.039 0.251*** 0.241 0.657***
(0.120) (0.058) (0.257) (0.147)
Years of Experience in the CCT -0.003 0.032*** -0.016 0.077***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.021) (0.019)
Age 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
(0.010) (0.006) (0.023) (0.017)
Length of Case -0.107*** -0.032 -0.038 -0.065
(0.019) (0.019) (0.036) (0.041)
Year -0.003 0.066*** -0.034 0.189***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.034) (0.032)
Constant 6.328 -133.140*** 68.523 -381.447***
(34.960) (35.341) (68.626) (64.156)
Procedural Cases
N 7308 19381 2889 7154
ll -4652.012 -9425.660 -1730.917 -3502.452
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.034 0.105 0.185
Note: Probit regression. Robust standard errors clustered by justices in parentheses. Two tailed tests: *
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Third and fourth models report the results for cases excluding the procedural
ones.
The second dimension is a significant determinant of justices’ votes at 95% confi-
dence level between 2002 and 2010 and at 99.9% confidence level between 2010 and
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2016. According to this, being a liberal or conservative had always been a significant
determinant of justices’ votes in annulment action cases during AKP rule. Consider-
ing that the AKP has been the center-right party upholding conservative values and
mobilizing conservative voters since 2002, this outcome is fairly expectable. Negative
coefficients of both models suggests that the more conservative a justices is, the less
likely she will vote against the unconstitutionality of newly enacted laws both before
and after the amendment. In addition, magnitudes of the coefficients of the second
dimension in the first and second models is very close to each other. Different from the
findings for the first dimension, we understand that the effect of liberal-conservative
dimension on the decision-making calculus of CCT justices was not altered with the
change in the Court’s composition.
Among justices’ background characteristics in the model, the estimates of two vari-
ables, whether a justice is a law faculty or a faculty of social sciences graduate, and the
years of justices’ experience in the CCT, are worthy of attention. While they are not
significant determinants of justices’ votes against AKP legislation between 2002 and
2010, they are significant at 95% confidence level between 2010 and 2016. Since both
variables’ coefficients are positive, we understand that being a law faculty graduate
and being a senior justice in the Court increases the probability of voting against AKP
legislation. Since 8 of 14 justices appointed after the change in the composition of the
CCT are graduates of faculties of social sciences, and new appointees have spent less
years in the Court, it signals that justices appointed by Gul or Erdogan are less likely
to vote against AKP legislation.
I plot the effects of the first and second dimension ideology scores on the probability
of voting against AKP legislation before and after the 2010 Constitutional Amendment
in Figure 11. The figure illustrates that for both the first and second dimension α-
NOMINATE estimates, predicted probabilities of voting against the unconstitutionality
of newly enacted laws were higher before 2010 than after the amendments. Since the
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Figure 11: Effects of the First and Second Dimension α-NOMINATE Scores on the
Probability of Voting against AKP Legislation before and after the 2010 (Models I and
II)
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confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities do not intercept, we understand
that the difference in the predicted probabilities of voting before and after 2010 are
statistically significantly different than zero for both dimensions. It suggests that no
matter how much restrainist or liberal a justice is, she is less likely after the amendment
to vote against AKP legislation than before it.
Though the overall decrease in the predicted probabilities also holds for the first
dimension, here I would like to focus more on the liberal-conservative dimension since
its effect on justices’ votes is significant at 95% confidence level before 2010. While the
most liberal justice would vote against the unconstitutionality of newly enacted laws
with 44.2% probability before 2010, she votes against it with 30.5% predicted probability
after 2010. Similarly, while the most conservative justice would vote against AKP
legislation with 27.2% probability before 2010, she would vote against it with 15.5%
predicted probability after the amendment. It seems that the expansion of the CCT
from eleven to seventeen members gave rise to a 12 to 14% decrease in the predicted
probabilities of voting against the unconstitutionality of annulment action cases. Since
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the means of the first and second models’ dependent variables respectively are 0.16 and
0.3, 12-14% decrease in predicted probabilities denotes substantive, alongside statistical
significance. Another point to make is that moving from the most liberal to the most
conservative α-NOMINATE estimate yields 17% decrease in the predicted probabilities
of voting for the unconstitutionality of AKP legislation before 2010 and 15% decrease
in it after 2010. In addition, the difference in the two poles of the liberal-conservative
dimension in terms of their effect on the predicted probabilities of voting stayed more
or less the same after the Court’s compositional change, meaning that the existing
ideological polarity in the second dimension has been preserved after the amendment.
A couple of important conclusions can be made in light of these findings. Firstly,
Table 5 in Chapter 3 has already demonstrated that the overall amount of justices’ yay
and nay votes before and after 2010 are statistically significantly different from each
other with a χ2 test at 99% confidence level. What these findings show is the change
in the effect of individual justices’ ideologies on their votes and thus on court decisions
after 2010. According to this, 1) activist-restrainist dimension became a significant
predictor of justices’ votes only after the constitutional amendment, which may amount
to a sharpening of ideological positions in the first dimension after 2010. 2) While the
difference between the two poles of the second dimension a-NOMINATE estimates in
terms of their effect on the predicted probabilities of voting stayed much the same
after 2010, the predicted probabilities of voting against the unconstitutionality have
decreased significantly after the amendment for each value in the Liberal-Conservative
ideology dimension. It might well show that a court-packing act does not only result in
a change in Court decisions by outvoting the majority, but it also effects all members in
such a way to alter their voting patterns, i.e., abstain from voting against ruling party’s
legislation.
Excluding Procedural Cases
I would also like to report the results of Models I and II for annulment action cases
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Figure 12: Effects of the First and Second Dimension α-NOMINATE Scores on the
Probability of Voting against AKP Legislation before and after the 2010 – Procedural
Cases are Excluded (Models III and IV)
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excluding the procedural ones (Models III and IV in Table 9) since it might better
reflect the effects of ideology scores on voting against AKP legislation for the reasons
explained in Chapter 4. As noted in the previous chapter, I expect an increase in the
coefficients of all variables when the unanimously decided cases are excluded from the
cases, and the regression outputs of Models III and IV in Table 9 meet this expecta-
tion. Similar to Models I and II, the activist-restrainist α-NOMINATE scores are not
significant determinants of justices votes’ before 2010, while they become statistically
significant with a negative coefficient after 2010. For the liberal-conservative dimension,
the significance level and the direction of the coefficients before and after 2010 are same
with those in Models I and II, while the magnitude of the coefficients are greater in
Models III and IV than those in Models I and II.
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In order to make sense of the difference in the magnitude of models’ coefficients,
in Figure 12, I plot the effects of the first and second dimension ideology scores on
the predicted probabilities of voting before and after 2010 in annulment action cases
excluding the procedural ones. As expected, predicted probabilities are higher when
we exclude the unanimously decided cases. After 2010, the predicted probabilities of
voting against AKP legislation increases to 37.5% for the most restrainist justices, and
59% for the most liberal justices, while the probabilities are, in turn, 24% and 30.5%
for the most restrainist and liberal justices respectively.
It is important to note that, however, we cannot see the significant decrease in the
predicted probabilities of voting for either of the ideology dimensions after the expansion
of the court from eleven to seventeen members. For the liberal-conservative dimension,
for example, predicted probabilities of voting against AKP legislation is almost the same
before and after the 2010 Amendment when we filter out the procedural cases from the
sample. The reason for this might be the existence of multiple cases unanimously voted
against the newly enacted laws between 2002 and 2010. In other words, the portion of
procedural cases that are unanimously voted against new legislations to the cases that
are unanimously voted in favor of them must be higher before 2010 than after it. It
further suggests the fading of the unanimous opposition against the ruling government
in the Court after the constitutional amendment.
5.2 Voting against Majority Decision
As noted in the previous chapter, high court justices’ dissenting patterns can inform us
about the political history of a country, and we showed that CCT justices dissenting
votes in annulment action cases between 2002 and 2016 are determined by their ideolo-
gies. In view of these findings, in this section, I would like to examine the impact of
2010 Constitutional Amendment on justices’ dissenting patterns.
Hypothesis 3: Only between 2010 and 2016, the more restrainist a justice is, the more
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likely she will vote against the majority decision in favor of, and the less likely she will
vote against the majority decision against AKP legislation.
Hypothesis 4: The more liberal a justice is, the more likely she will vote against the
majority decision in favor of AKP legislation both before and after 2010, while she is
less likely to vote against the majority decision against AKP legislation only until 2010.
The third and fourth hypotheses ask whether the expansion of CCT from eleven to
seventeen members had an impact on the predictive power of justices’ ideology scores on
their dissenting votes in annulment action cases during the AKP rule. As in the previous
chapter, I divided the sample into two based on their outcome of the decisions (i.e.
whether the case is concluded for or against the unconstitutionality of the newly enacted
law) for the reasons explained before. I expect 1) statistically significant difference in
the predictive power of ideology scores’ effect on justices’ dissenting votes before and
after 2010, and 2) different direction in justices’ dissenting behavior (conditional on
majority vote) both before and after 2010 whenever the effects of ideology scores are
statistically significant.
Table 10 illustrates the probit regression estimates of the determinants of justices’
dissents against majority decision before and after 2010, including and excluding the
procedural cases, and when majority vote is for and against the unconstitutionality.
Accordingly, the first dimension ideology is a statistically significant determinants of
justices’ dissenting votes only for the cases resolved after 2010. After 2010, first di-
mension ideology scores are significant at 95% confidence level when the majority is
in favor of AKP legislation, and significant at 95% confidence level when the majority
is against AKP legislation. In addition, the coefficients are in the expected directions.
After 2010, being a restrainist justice increases the probability that a justice will vote
against the majority decision in favor of AKP legislation, and decreases the probability
that she will vote against the majority decision against AKP legislation.
In Figure 13, I plot the effects of the first dimension α-NOMINATE scores on justices’
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Figure 13: Effects of the First Dimension α-NOMINATE Scores on the Probability of
Dissenting against the Majority Decision before and after 2010 – Procedural Cases are
Excluded (Models IX, X, XI and XII)
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dissents in the annulment action cases before and after 2010, when there is at least one
dissent in the conclusion of a case. Since I have explained what difference filtering out
the procedural cases makes in the predictions in the previous chapter, here I will only
report the predicted probabilities of justices’ dissenting votes in annulment action cases
excluding the procedural ones.24
As Figure 13 illustrates, activist-restrainist ideology is not a statistically significant
in explaining justices’ dissenting votes before the 2010 Constitutional Amendment. Af-
ter 2010, however, moving from low to high levels on the first ideological dimension
scores leads to a 27% increase in the predicted probability of dissenting when the ma-
24The figures plotting the predicted probabilities of dissenting before and after 2010 for the universe
of cases can be found in the appendices of this chapter (Figures 19 and 20).
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jority is in favor of AKP legislation, and a 28% decrease when the majority is against
AKP legislation. The means of the models’ dependent variable dissent for the cases
excluding procedural ones after 2010 are 0.16 when the majority is in favor of AKP leg-
islation, and 0.3 when majority is in favor of it. For this reason, the findings reported
in Figure 13 has substantive and statistical significance. Another point regarding the
results is that for each point increase in the activist-restrainist dimension, the predicted
probabilities of dissenting becoems about 10% higher when the majority is against AKP
legislation compared to when the majority is in favor of it. It amounts to that after
the compositional change of the court, justices are about 10% more likely to dissent the
majority decision when it leans against AKP legislation.
Figure 13 provides empirical support for the third hypothesis. As it can be observed,
the change in the composition of the CCT had a significant impact in the effect of
justices’ ideology scores on the predicted probabilities of dissenting. Before 2010, being
a restrainist or activist justice would not significantly affect whether the justice would
dissent against the majority decision in an action for annulment, after 2010, however,
the polarity in the first dimension seems to have crystallized in a way to determine
whether the justices dissent in annulment cases.
The findings for the second dimension are a bit less straightforward to interpret.
As shown in Table 10, the second dimension α-NOMINATE estimates are statistically
significant for the cases held before 2010 in expected directions at 95% confidence level.
After 2010, however, they became statistically significant predictors of justices’ dissent-
ing votes only when the majority is in favor of AKP legislation. In addition, the increase
coefficients’ magnitudes and their significance level after 2010, at least when the ma-
jority is in favor of AKP legislation, signals the increasing polarization and importance
of the liberal-conservative ideology dimension in the CCT.
Focusing on the magnitudes of control variables might explain why ideology cannot
predict justices’ dissenting votes after 2010 when the majority is against AKP legisla-
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Figure 14: Effects of the Second Dimension α-NOMINATE Scores on the Probability
of Dissenting against the Majority Decision before and after 2010 – Procedural Cases
are Excluded (Models IX, X, XI and XII)
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tion. Model 12 in Table 10 shows that the predictive power of the two control variables
“military background” and “law faculty graduate” (whether justices had served in a mil-
itary court before CCT and whether they are graduates of law faculties) seem so strong
that other variables including the second dimension α-NOMINATE remain ineffective
in explaining justices’ dissenting votes. According to this, having served in a military
court is a statistically highly significant determinant of justices’ dissent and increases
the probability that they vote against the majority decision for the unconstitutionality
of AKP legislation. This finding might be considered surprising since one would expect
a justice with military background to score highly on the activist-restrainist dimension,
i.e., be a restrainist desiring to preserve the foundational state ideology, and dissent
with less probability when the majority is against AKP legislation. For law faculty
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graduates, expectedly, the probability of voting against AKP legislation is lower when
the majority vote is already against it.
The effects of the second ideological dimension on the predicted probabilities of
dissenting before and after 2010 are plotted in Figure 14. While the most liberal justice
would dissent against the majority decision in favor of AKP legislation with a predicted
probability of 40.5% before the 2010 Constitutional Amendment, she would vote against
it with 73% predicted probability after the compositional change. Such increase in the
predictions is another striking example of how much the ideological polarity is intensified
within the CCT after its expansion. It also provides empirical evidence for the fourth
hypothesis.
In the cases when the majority is against AKP legislation, moving from low to high
scores of second dimension ideology scores suggests a 38% change in the predicted
probabilities of dissenting the majority decision in cases held before 2010. After 2010,
however, the figure shows no such change in the predicted probabilities when we move
from low to high scores of liberal-conservative dimension. It might amount to the fading
of the opposition in the court with the compositional change. In such case, however,
one would also expect similar findings for the cases when the majority is in favor of
AKP legislation. Although it is hard to explain this much of a difference between the
predicted probabilities of dissenting when the majority decision is for and against AKP
legislation, as I noted above, I attribute this difference to the great significance of control
variables compared to the second dimension ideology scores.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
This thesis bears significant findings regarding the CCT’s place in contemporary Turk-
ish politics. Among the main objectives of the thesis have been describing the Court’s
ideological positioning, and explaining the Court justices’ voting behavior in annulment
action cases during AKP period. In line with the previous literature depicting Turkish
political space as multidimensional (Carkoglu and Hinich 2006, Moral and Tokdemir
2017), this study provided evidence for that activist-restrainist and liberal-conservative
dimensions correctly represent CCT justices’ ideological positioning, and also that jus-
tices appointed by different presidents show statistically significantly different ideolog-
ical preferences. While the mean justice Sezer appointed seems to fall at around the
restrainist and liberal poles, the mean justices Gul and Erdogan appointed fall within
the conservative and activist poles. Apparently, the CCT has been through sharp ide-
ological transformations during Sezer’s and Gul’s presidencies. As we understood, the
CCT became increasingly restrainist between 2005 and 2010, which was most probably
the reason for AKP to call forth the judicial reform discussions in 2010.
The findings further suggested that justices are not mere adjudicators of what the
legal scripts dictate, but are motivated by their ideological preferences and certain
background characteristics. These findings are in line with the previous literature on
judicial behavior. In the same way with the highest court justices of the US, Norway,
Britain, Spain and France, ideology is a significant determinant of CCT justices. Within
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the two dimensional ideology space, the results suggest that the more liberal and the
more restrainist a justice is, the more likely she will rule that the AKP legislation is
unconstitutional, while the more conservative and the more activist a justice is, the less
likely she is to rule against AKP legislation.
It is important to re-emphasize that the dependent variable on which we measured
ideology’s effect is the AKP legislation between 2002 and 2016. These are the cases
which high-ranking AKP members argued to prove that the country is governed under
judicial tutelage.25 This thesis provided evidence that CCT justices’ ideological pref-
erences are important factors in the determination of whether a law enacted by AKP
will stay in force. In a way, CTT is another political body evaluating the constitution-
ality of new legislation in light of the existing justices’ ideological preferences, so far
as the keen constitutional constraints permit. Whether to call this kind of a check on
the legislative power “judicial tutelage” as AKP members frequently did, however, is a
political choice, I would say. After all, at least for the case of Turkey, all justices have
been appointees of Presidents who were, in turn, elected either by the parliament or,
recently, directly by the people. In other words, justices have always been appointed by
the elected bodies. In a democracy with a properly working horizontal accountability,
being checked by the appointees of the previous presidents would be the guarantee of
the system continuation, not an imposition of tutelage.
The findings also manifested the extreme polarity within the Court. The difference
in the probabilities that a hypothetical highly activist and conservative justice and a
highly restrainist and liberal justice to vote against AKP legislation is as high as 70%
when we exclude the procedural cases. This percentage difference as a consequence of
polarity is so high that it is almost certain that two justices positioned on the different
extremes of the two-dimensional ideological space will vote differently when a newly
25Yeni Safak News. January 14th, 2010. Bekir Bozdag: “AKP period is the period during which
the highest number of annulment decisions are made. Currently the military is being blamed, but in
fact there is judicial tutelage in Turkey.” https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/yargi-vesayeti-sistemi-
kilitliyor-235287 Accessed on June 27th, 2018.
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enacted law is brought to the Court for annulment. This magnitude of polarity might
be considered a reflection of the growing polarization in the parliament and the society.
This study has been the first to systematically examine CCT justices’ dissenting
behavior. Interestingly, the findings show that the direction of justices’ dissenting votes
depends on the direction of the majority decision. In addition, ideology also proves
also to be a significant determinant of justices’ dissents against the majority decision.
Taken together, it seems to me that when a controversial case is brought to the Court
for annulment, usually the same clusters of justices vote for or against the annulment,
and choose to side with those who dissent or not.
The second main objective of the thesis was to empirically assess the effect of the
compositional change on the decisions CCT justices make. The comparison of the
effects of justices’ ideology scores on the probability of voting before and after 2010
Constitutional Amendment shows that the probabilities of voting against AKP legis-
lation has significantly dropped after the change in the Court’s composition. In other
words, not only the Court has become less restrainist with the compositional change in
2010, but also the probability that any justice, including the existing restrainist ones, of
finding AKP legislation unconstitutional has significantly decreased. Not surprisingly,
yet strikingly, the court-packing act of increasing court size from 11 to 17 members
has created a more amenable, if not a more submissive Court. In a way, the findings
provide suppor for those arguing that AKP aimed at extending its influence over the
Court. However, we cannot conclude whether it is democratized, i.e., whether it be-
came more representative of the parliament/society. What we know are 1) the Court
has become highly restrainist before 2010 Amendment, especially between 2005 and
2010; 2) the activist-restrainist ideology dimension was not a significant determinant
of justices’ votes or dissents before 2010, but has become significant after it. Combin-
ing these findings, It is possible to argue that the Court made ideological decisions in
certain key cases before 2010. However, the degree to which justices prefer preserving
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the Kemalist state ideology did not motivate their votes in the universe of annulment
action cases between these years.
This project provides us with a strong idea about AKP’s motivations for initiating
the 2010 reforms. As previously noted, high-ranking AKP members have often noted
that the judicial reforms were aimed at democratizing the Court. Though the Court
had become highly restrainist before the Constitutional Amendment, I could not find
any empirical evidence suggesting that the Court has neutralized. On the contrary, the
Court has driven to the activist and conservative extremes, become highly polarized and
more likely to vote in favor of the AKP legislation. After 2010, for these reasons, the
Court seems to have transformed into a form that is highly desirable for the AKP. In my
opinion, it goes without saying that this court-packing act was a successfully organized
project aimed at subduing the Court. One cannot help but wonder whether the reforms
undertaken in other state institutions have yielded similar transformations. I hope that
this thesis motivates further research investigating other constitutional changes that
other state institutions have been subject to in this period.
6.1 Limitations of the Study
I would like to note that the α-NOMINATE ideal point estimation takes the ideology
space to be stable over time. In other words, it assumes that justices have constant
ideology scores which do not vary over time. Whether this assumption holds for the
CCT justices has been a question I have struggled during my study. Previous research
shows how the voters’ ideological stands evolve over time (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu,
2009), and I doubt if the society’s attitudes do not reflect in the ideology space of
a political institution. Critics of this assumption formulated the dynamic ideal point
estimation, also known as the Martin-Quinn scores (2002), which introduces latent ideal
points and allows for spatial movements over time. This model, however, assumes the
political space to be one-dimensional, and do not provide two-dimensional dynamic ideal
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points estimates. Among these two models, I found α-NOMINATE estimates to better
fit to our data. In other words, a two dimensional ideology space that is stable over time
provides better fit than the one-dimensional space moving over time. Nevertheless, a
more precise estimate of the effect of the CCT justices’ ideologies on the probability of
voting might have been to use multi-dimensional ideal point estimates that vary over
time.
Another limitation of the study is the use of sub-sample models as the method of
comparison. Considering that between 2002 and 2016, the justices serving in the Court
has been subject to a gradual change, dividing the sample in accordance with the date of
case conclusion has its limits in showing the exact impact of the Court’s compositional
change on the decisions it makes. To illustrate, the Court has already begun being
conservatized with the justices appointed by Gul before the examined Constitutional
Amendment, and continued getting more so with the justices appointed after the initial
increase in the number of members in 2010. Although taking the amendment date as a
milestone and comparing the justices’ voting behavior prove to be a useful exercise in
many respects, it may exaggerate the exact simultaneous impact of the compositional
change.
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Appendices
Table 11 List of Justices
Justice 1st Dim. 2nd Dim. President Entry Exit
Ahmet H. Boyacioglu -0,332051 0,129346 Sunay 17-Sep-1970 6-Apr-1985
Necdet Daricioglu -0,720141 -0,090904 Koruturk 24-Oct-1977 4-May-1991
Kenan Terzioglu -0,314232 0,202758 Koruturk 18-Sep-1978 1-Aug-1986
H. Karamustantikoglu -0,499222 0,201958 Koruturk 19-Sep-1978 1-Dec-1984
M. Y. Aliefendioglu 0,914174 -1,135437 Koruturk 16-Jan-1979 15-Nov-1995
Yekta Gungor Ozden -1,835970 -0,827173 Koruturk 16-Jan-1979 1-Jan-1998
Orhan Onar -0,416440 0,266150 Koruturk 1-Apr-1980 1-Mar-1988
Muammer Turan 0,289794 -1,043479 Evren 10-Feb-1981 10-Jun-1990
Mehmet Nuri Cinarli 0,951718 0,025342 Evren 9-Apr-1981 1-Jul-1990
Servet Tuzun 0,996922 0,798416 Evren 8-Jul-1981 2-Aug-1993
Selahattin Metin -1,148290 0,409398 Evren 10-Jul-1981 15-Apr-1988
Mahmut C. Cuhruk -0,266605 0,086891 Evren 2-Oct-1981 1-Mar-1990
Hasan Semih Ozmert 0,818904 0,333853 Evren 2-Oct-1981 27-Jul-1986
Osman Mikdat Kilic -0,371607 0,285212 Evren 16-Mar-1982 1-Jul-1985
Mustafa Gonul 0,411932 -0,308346 Evren 12-Feb-1985 20-Aug-1994
Mustafa Sahin 0,515431 -0,278636 Evren 17-May-1985 1-Jul-1993
Adnan Kukner -0,597054 0,051262 Evren 28-Nov-1985 1-Jul-1988
Vural Savas 0,213328 0,562772 Evren 16-Sep-1986 19-Oct-1988
Mehmet Serif Atalay 0,656942 -0,507378 Evren 1-Oct-1986 1-Jul-1989
A. Oguz Akdoganli -0,736381 -0,212208 Evren 25-Mar-1987 19-Nov-1993
hsan Pekel 0,304310 0,069634 Evren 21-Mar-1988 1-Nov-1995
Selcuk Tuzun -0,865905 -0,416188 Evren 2-May-1988 14-Feb-1998
Ahmet Necdet Sezer -1,103016 -0,213134 Evren 28-Sep-1988 28-Sep-1998
Erol Cansel 0,277970 0,511539 Evren 7-Dec-1988 23-Jun-1992
Yavuz Nazaroglu 0,574406 0,089057 Ozal 11-Apr-1990 1-Jul-1992
Guven Dincer 3,152281 -0,728884 Ozal 9-Jul-1990 24-Nov-1999
Samia Akbulut 0,268775 0,164374 Ozal 30-Oct-1990 12-Feb-2004
Hasim Kilic 0,107251 0,845753 Ozal 24-Nov-1990 10-Feb-2015
Yalcin Acargun -2,128359 -0,321181 Ozal 31-May-1991 3-Jan-2004
Mustafa Bumin -0,265023 -0,179203 Ozal 9-Nov-1992 26-Jun-2005
Sacit Adali 0,292361 0,831346 Ozal 16-Mar-1993 5-Mar-2010
Ali Huner -0,692180 -0,046728 Demirel 22-Sep-1993 28-May-2004
Lutfi F. Tuncel 1,238437 -0,136009 Demirel 2-Nov-1993 1-Oct-1999
Mustafa Yakupoglu 0,506560 -0,597462 Demirel 18-May-1994 14-Jul-2000
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Justice 1st Dim. 2nd Dim. President Entry Exit
Nurettin Turan 0,591058 0,236836 Demirel 25-Jan-1995 24-Jan-2003
Fulya Kantarcioglu -0,581846 -0,632912 Demirel 19-Dec-1995 17-Feb-2013
Aysel Pekiner -0,878978 -0,295007 Demirel 21-Dec-1995 10-Apr-2004
Mahir Can licak -0,980574 -0,732841 Demirel 4-Feb-1998 5-Aug-2001
Rustu Sonmez -1,018682 -0,541279 Demirel 1-Jun-1998 3-Jun-2002
Ertugrul Ersoy 0,588643 -0,327701 Demirel 8-Dec-1999 1-Jan-2005
H. Tulay Tugcu 0,194231 -0,469798 Demirel 24-Dec-1999 12-Jun-2007
Ahmet Akyalcin 1,039545 0,314373 Sezer 16-Apr-2000 16-Mar-2012
Enis Tunga 0,906080 -0,345142 Sezer 10-Aug-2001 10-Jun-2003
Mehmet Erten 0,780179 -0,379855 Sezer 2-Jul-2002 9-Feb-2014
Mustafa Yildirim 0,546936 -0,178895 Sezer 24-Feb-2003 1-Feb-2010
Cafer Sat 0,438576 0,239356 Sezer 14-Jul-2003 3-Jan-2010
Fazil Saglam -1,470438 -0,966841 Sezer 22-Aug-2003 23-Feb-2005
A. Necmi Ozler 0,841586 -0,469674 Sezer 18-Feb-2004 1-Apr-2010
Fettah Oto 0,477834 -0,660878 Sezer 30-Apr-2004 1-Dec-2011
Serdar Ozguldur 1,566288 0,757786 Sezer 21-Jun-2004
O. Alifeyyaz Paksut -0,264176 -0,224882 Sezer 1-Jul-2005
Serruh Kaleli 2,163994 0,613768 Sezer 19-Jul-2005
Sevket Apalak 0,941641 -0,967323 Sezer 20-Jul-2005 2-Nov-2010
Zehra Ayla Perktas 0,474716 -0,567961 Sezer 27-Jun-2007 15-Dec-2014
Recep Komurcu 0,125356 0,493528 Gul 4-Dec-2008
Dr. Alparslan Altan -0,684533 0,225060 Gul 30-Mar-2010 4-Aug-2016
Burhan Ustun 0,370689 0,654696 Gul 30-Mar-2010
Prof. Engin Yildirim -0,384184 0,116721 Gul 9-Apr-2010
Nuri Necipoglu 0,236828 0,880620 Gul 22-Apr-2010 2-Jul-2018
Hicabi Dursun -0,736204 0,789907 Gul 6-Oct-2010
Celal Mumtaz Akinci 0,483744 0,894966 Gul 13-Oct-2010
Prof. Erdal Tercan -0,997220 -0,051716 Gul 7-Jan-2011 4-Aug-2016
Muammer Topal 0,057015 0,660404 Gul 29-Jan-2012
Prof. Zuhtu Arslan -1,274453 0,275846 Gul 17-Apr-2012
Muhammed Emin Kuz -1,524516 0,704032 Gul 8-Mar-2013
Hasan Tahsin Gokcan 0,010730 0,407549 Gul 17-Mar-2014
Kadir Ozkaya -0,766176 0,613819 Erdogan 18-Dec-2014
Ridvan Gulec -1,472707 0,110727 Erdogan 13-Mar-2015
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Figure 15: The Predicted Probability of Voting for the Unconstitutionality of the AKP
Legislation. (Model I)
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Figure 16: The Predicted Probability of Voting for the Unconstitutionality of the AKP
Legislation (Model II)
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Figure 17: The Predicted Probability of Voting against Majority Decision (Models III
and IV)
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Figure 18: The Predicted Probability of Voting against Majority Decision – Procedual
Cases are Excluded (Models V and VI)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
oti
ng
 ag
ain
st 
M
ajo
rity
 D
eci
sio
n)
−.88 .04 .96
Majority in favor of AKP Legislation
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
oti
ng
 ag
ain
st 
M
ajo
rity
 D
eci
sio
n)
−.88 .04 .96
2nd Dimension (α−nominate)
1st Dimension=−2 1st Dimension=0 1st Dimension=2
Majority against AKP Legislation
81
Figure 19: Effects of the First Dimension α-NOMINATE Scores on the Probability of
Dissenting against the Majority Decision before and after 2010 (Model I, II, III and IV)
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Figure 20: Effects of the Second Dimension α-NOMINATE Scores on the Probability
of Dissenting against the Majority Decision before and after 2010 (Models I, II, III and
IV)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Pr
(O
pp
os
ing
 th
e M
ajo
rity
 O
pin
ion
=1
)
B
ef
or
e 
20
10
Majority in favor of the AKP Legislation Majority against the AKP Legislation
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Pr
(O
pp
os
ing
 th
e M
ajo
rity
 O
pin
ion
=1
)
A
fte
r 2
01
0
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
2nd Dimension (α−NOMINATE)
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
2nd Dimension (α−NOMINATE)
83
References
Amnesty International. 2004. Venezuela: Human Rights under Threat. Report Amnesty
International.
URL: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR53/005/2004/en/
Armstrong, D. A.; R. Bakker; R. Carroll; C. Hare; K. T. Poole and H. Rosenthal.
2014. Analyzing Spatial Models of Choice and Judgment with R. Florida: Taylor and
Francis.
Aydin, A. 2012. Strategic Interaction Between Constitutional Courts and Political
Actors in Developing Democracies. Sabanci University. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis.
Bali, A. 2011-12. “The Perils of Judicial Independence: Constitutional Transition and
the Turkish Example.” Virginia Journal of International Law 52(2):235.
Bartole, S.; De Guillenchmidth, J.; Gsthl H.; Hamilton J.; Hoffman-Riem W.;
Sejersted F. and B. Maan. 2010. Interim Opinion on the Draft Law on the High
Council for Judges and Public Prosecutors (of 27 Sept. 2010) of Turkey. Report
Venice Commission.
URL: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD(20 10)042-e
BBC News. 2010. “Turkish Reform Vote Gets Western Backing.” BBC News. September
13.
URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11279881
Belge, C. 2006. “Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and Selective Activism
of the Constitutional Court of Turkey.” Law and Society Review 40(3):653–692.
Carkoglu, A. and E. Kalaycioglu. 2009. The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
84
Carkoglu, A. and M. J. Hinich. 2006. “A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences.”
Electoral Studies 25(2):369–392.
Carroll, R.; C. Hare; J. B. Lewis; J. Lo; K. T. Poole; and H. Rosenthal. 2013. Anomi-
nate: a-NOMINATE Ideal Point Estimator. 0.01 ed.
Carrubba, C. J.; Gabel M. and C. Hankla. 2012. “Understanding the Role of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in European Integration.” American Political Science Review
106(1):214–223.
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. November 7, 1982. As Amended on 1987, May
17.
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. November 7, 1982. As Amended on 2010,
September 12.
Corrales, J. 2005. “In Search of a Theory of Polarization: Lessons from Venezuela,
1999-2005.” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 79:105–118.
Cumhuriyet. 2014. “Take off your Robe and Engage in Politics.” Cumhuriyet. April 13.
URL: http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/133000/Basbakan-dan-yargiya-
Cubbe ni-cikar-siyasete-gir.html
Cushman, B. 2013. “Court-Packing and Compromise.” Scholarly Works 954:1–30.
Epstein, L. 2016. “Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior.” William and
Mary Law Review 57(6):2017–2073.
Epstein, L.; Landes, W. M. and R. A. Posner. 2013. The Behavior of Federal Judges:
A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Epstein, L.; Martin, A. D.; Quinn K. M. and J. A. Segal. 2012. Ideology and the Study
of Judicial Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
85
Epstein, L.; Martin, A. D.; Segal J. A. and C. Westerland. 2007. “The Judicial Common
Space.” Journal of Law Economics and Organization 23(2):303–325.
Epstein, L.; Posner, R. A. and W. M. Landes. 2011. “Why (and When) Judges Dissent:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Legal Analysis 3(1):101–137.
Erguder, U. 1980-81. “Changing Patterns of Electoral Behaviour in Turkey.” Bogazici
University Journal (8-9):45–81.
Ertekin, O. G. 2001. Yargi Meselesi Hallolundu: Yargiclarin Essekli Demokrasi ile
Imtihani. Ankara: Epos Yayinlari.
Esmer, Y. 2002. At the Ballot Box: Determinants of Voting Behaviour in Turkey.
Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner pp. 95–114.
F., Theodore E.; Talia and Rosen-Zvi I. 2012. “Does the Judge Matter? Exploiting
Random Assignment on a Court of Last Resort to Assess Judge and Case Selection
Effects.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 9(2):246–290.
Garoupa, N.; Gomez-Pomar, F. and V. Grembi. 2013. “Judging Under Political Pres-
sure: An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Consti-
tutional Court.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 29(3):513–534.
Genckaya, O. F. and E. Ozbudun. 2009. Democratization and the Politics of
Constitution-Making in Turkey. Budapest: Central European UP.
Grendstad, G; Waltenburg, E. N. and W. R. Shaffer. 2015. Policy Making in an Inde-
pendent Judiciary: The Norwegian Supreme Court. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.
Gursoy, Y. 2015. Security Sector Reform in Turkey: The Military, Intelligence and
Police during the AKP Era. Vol. 4 LSE Middle East Centre pp. 32–40.
Hazama, Y. 2012. “Hegemonic Preservation or Horizontal Accountability: Constitu-
tional Review in Turkey.” International Political Science Review 33(4):421–440.
86
Heise, M. 2002. “The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Ju-
dicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism.” University of Illinois Law Review
(4):819–850.
Helmke, G. 2002. “The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in
Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy.” American Political Science Review
96(2):291–303.
Helmke, G. 2003. “Checks and Balances by Other Means: Strategic Defection and
Argentina’s Supreme Court in the 1990s.” Comparative Politics 35(2):213–230.
Hirschl, R. 2004. “The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism.” Indiana Journal
of Global Legal Studies 11(1):71–108.
Honnige, C. 2009. “The Electoral Connection: How the Pivotal Judge Affects Op-
positional Success at European Constitutional Courts.” West European Politics
32(5):963–984.
Hughes, C. E. 1928. The Supreme Court of the United States. USA: Columbia University
Press.
Human Rights Watch. 2004. Questions and Answers about Venezuelas Court-Packing
Law. Report Human Rights Watch.
URL: http://hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/venezuela/2004/
Hurriyet. 2013. “Erdogan: Orada Bir Yanlis Yaptik.” Hurriyet. December 29.
URL: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-orada-bir-yanlis-yaptik-
25465765
Hurriyet. 2016. “Constitutional Court should be abolished.” Hurriyet. March 13.
URL: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/anayasa-mahkemesi-kaldirilmali-
40067785
87
Hurriyet Daily News. 2013. “I would Judge the Supreme Council of Judges and
Prosecutors if I had Authority: Turkish PM.” Hurriyet Daily News. December 27.
URL: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/i-would-judge-the-supreme-councilof-
judges-an d-prosecutors-if-i-had-authority-turkish-pm-60233
Iaryczower, M. and G. Katz. 2016. “More than Politics: Ability and Ideology in
the British Appellate Committee.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
32(1):61–93.
Iaryczower, M.; Spiller, P. T. and M. Tommasi. 2002. “Judicial Independence in Un-
stable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998.” American Journal of Political Science
46(4):699–716.
Kalaycioglu, E. 1994. “Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey - Changes and Con-
tinuities in the 1990s.” Comparative Political Studies 27(3):402–424.
Kalaycioglu, E. 2005. Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Kalaycioglu, E. 2012. “Kulturkampf in Turkey: The Constitutional Referendum of 12
September 2010.” South European Society and Politics 17(1):1–22.
Mardin, S. 1975. Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics? Istanbul:
Bogazici University Press.
Martin, A. D. and K. M. Quinn. 2002. “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999.” Political Analysis
10:134–153.
Meernik, J. 2003. “Victors Justice or the Law: Judging and Punishing at the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
47(2):140–162.
88
Moral, M. 2016. “Replication Data for: Justices ‘en Garde’: Ideolog-
ical Determinants of the Dissolution of Anti-Establishment Parties.”
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/F8ITEB, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:sfJn/
1bFJZDMd/5+UPL/BQ==.
Moral, M. and E. Tokdemir. 2017. “Justices ’en Garde’: Ideological Determinants of
the Dissolution of Anti-Establishment Parties.” International Political Science Review
38(3):264–280.
Mynet News. 2013. “Some Elites Struggle for Reversing the Democracy Back.” Mynet
News. October 21.
URL: http://www.mynet.com/haber/politika/kurtulmustan-demokratiklesme-
aciklamasi-8 35726-1
Ozbudun, E. 2000. Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consoli-
dation. Boulder, London: Lynne Reinner.
Ozbudun, E. 2006. Political Origins of the Turkish Constitutional Court and the Prob-
lem of Democratic Legitimacy. Ankara: Turkiye Barolar Birligi.
Ozbudun, E. 2015a. Pending Challenges in Turkeys Judiciary. Report.
URL: www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte-pb-20.pdf
Ozbudun, E. 2015b. “Turkey’s Judiciary and the Drift Toward Competitive Authori-
tarianism.” International Spectator 50(2):42–55.
Poole, K. T. and H. Rosenthal. 1997. Congress : A Political-Economic History of Roll
Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press.
Posner, E. A. and M. F. P. de Figueiredo. 2005. “Is the International Court of Justice
Biased?” Journal of Legal Studies (2):599–630.
89
Rasmusen, J.; Ramseyer M. and Eric B. 2001. “Why Are Japanese Judges so Conserva-
tive in Politically Charged Cases?” American Political Science Review 95(2):331–344.
Robinson, N. 2013. “A Quantitative Analysis of the Indian Supreme Courts Workload.”
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 10(3):570–601.
Schofield, N. M.; Gallego, U.; Ozdemir U. and U. Zakharov. 2011. “Competition for
Popular Support: A Valence Model of Elections in Turkey.” Social Choice Welfare
36(3):451–482.
Senate Committee. 1937. On the Judiciary, Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary.
Report Senate Judiciary Committee, 75th Congress, 1st Session.
URL: https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001142537
Shambayati, H. and E. Kirdis. 2009. “In Pursuit of ’Contemporary Civilization’: Judi-
cial Empowerment in Turkey.” Political Research Quarterly 62(4):767–780.
Somer, M. 2017. “Conquering versus Democratizing the State: Political Islamists and
Fourth Wave Democratization in Turkey and Tunisia.” Democratization 24(6):1025–
1043.
Songer, D. R. and S. W. Johnson. 2007. “Judicial Decision Making in the Supreme
Court of Canada: Updating the Personal Attribute Model.” Canadian Journal of
Political Science 40(4):911–934.
Staton, J. K. 2006. “Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Re-
sults.” American Journal of Political Science 50(1):98–112.
Suchman, M. C. and E. Mertz. 2010. “Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical
Legal Studies and New Legal Realism.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science
6:555–579.
90
The Telegraph. 2014. “Turkey continues with huge purge of judges and police.” The
Telegraph. January 22.
URL: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10590399/Turkey-
co ntinues-with-hugepurge-of-judges-and-police.html
TRT News. 2013. “Democratic Transformation will be Completed in 10 Years.” TRT
News. March 13.
URL: http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/10-yil-icinde-demokratik-donusum-
tama mlanacak-78182.html
Ulmer, S. S. 1970. “Dissent Behavior and the Social Background of Supreme Court
Justices.” Journal of Politics 32(3):580–598.
Vanberg, G. 2001. “Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to
Constitutional Review.” American Journal of Political Science 45(2):346–361.
Varol, O. O.; Dalla Pellegrina, L. and N. Garoupa. 2017. “An Empirical Analysis of Ju-
dicial Transformation in Turkey.” American Journal of Comparative Law 65(1):187–
216.
Voeten, E. 2008. “The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights.” American Political Science Review 102(4):417–433.
Yeni Safak. 2010. “Judicial Tutelage Blocks the System.” Yeni Safak. January 14.
URL: https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/yargi-vesayeti-sistemi-kilitliyor-235287
Yildirim, E.; Kutlar, A. and S. Gulener. 2017. “1962-1982 Donemi Anayasa Mahkemesi
Uyelerinin Yargsal Ideal Noktalarinin Belirlenmesi.” Amme Idaresi Dergisi 50(4):1–
31.
91
